Average utilitarianism is consequentialist, but not locally consequentialist. Your actions affect the global average utility of the universe, but you have no way of measuring the global average utility of the universe. Trying to make any version of utilitarianism local is even more doomed than utilitarianism in general.
For example you can aggregate utility only over your own future light-cone, which does address the locally consequentialist objection. Now you have an unknown number of agents that all have different future light-cones, and therefore different aggregated measures of utility for the same consequences. That subjectivity throws away the one positive trait that any form of utilitarianism offers in the first place: that the aggregated utility (assuming complete information, and using whatever aggregation rule happens to apply) is objective.
Well, that is a very good point, huh. There is no such thing as non-local consequentialism in the world we live in, so global consequentialism ought to be discarded as an unworkable model in normative ethics. I assume that local consequentialism is still meaningful.
subjectivity throws away the one positive trait that any form of utilitarianism offers in the first place: that the aggregated utility (assuming complete information, and using whatever aggregation rule happens to apply) is objective.
Huh, where does this “objective” part come from? One can be locally consequentialist and act based on all available information, subject to the laws of physics, no?
The main principle of utilitarianism (beyond basic consequentialism) is that the consequences can be measured by some form of utility that can be objectively aggregated. That is, that there is some way to combine these utilities into a totally ordered “greatest good for the greatest number” instead of just considering all points on the Pareto frontier to be mutually incomparable.
The various types of utilitarianism can be viewed as specific means to define and measure the utility of various types of consequences, and variations in how to carry out the aggregation.
Average utilitarianism is consequentialist, but not locally consequentialist. Your actions affect the global average utility of the universe, but you have no way of measuring the global average utility of the universe. Trying to make any version of utilitarianism local is even more doomed than utilitarianism in general.
For example you can aggregate utility only over your own future light-cone, which does address the locally consequentialist objection. Now you have an unknown number of agents that all have different future light-cones, and therefore different aggregated measures of utility for the same consequences. That subjectivity throws away the one positive trait that any form of utilitarianism offers in the first place: that the aggregated utility (assuming complete information, and using whatever aggregation rule happens to apply) is objective.
Well, that is a very good point, huh. There is no such thing as non-local consequentialism in the world we live in, so global consequentialism ought to be discarded as an unworkable model in normative ethics. I assume that local consequentialism is still meaningful.
Huh, where does this “objective” part come from? One can be locally consequentialist and act based on all available information, subject to the laws of physics, no?
Not all consequentialism is utilitarianism.
The main principle of utilitarianism (beyond basic consequentialism) is that the consequences can be measured by some form of utility that can be objectively aggregated. That is, that there is some way to combine these utilities into a totally ordered “greatest good for the greatest number” instead of just considering all points on the Pareto frontier to be mutually incomparable.
The various types of utilitarianism can be viewed as specific means to define and measure the utility of various types of consequences, and variations in how to carry out the aggregation.