But anyway, the distinction of ‘creating a memory’ does not apply when you consider the observer and experiment together as a single quantum system.
Why not?
Let’s say I am looking at a clock.
I’m a physical thing, interacting with another physical thing. You can consider me+clock to be a single physical system.
I still record the measurement in my memory. I still remember looking at the clock. That doesn’t magically go away.
Accroding to Everett, his idea is to “deduce the subjective appearance of phenomena” by looking that contents of my memory.
In other words, Everett’s model does not make a prediction until a measurement record is created. He then suggests these measurment records are consistent with our empirical observations, and also the equivalient to the predictions derived from a collapse.
If the memory of an observer is destroyed before its measurements can be deduced, then the model doesn’t have any measurement records (ie, no predictions).
Why not?
Let’s say I am looking at a clock.
I’m a physical thing, interacting with another physical thing. You can consider me+clock to be a single physical system.
I still record the measurement in my memory. I still remember looking at the clock. That doesn’t magically go away.
Accroding to Everett, his idea is to “deduce the subjective appearance of phenomena” by looking that contents of my memory.
In other words, Everett’s model does not make a prediction until a measurement record is created. He then suggests these measurment records are consistent with our empirical observations, and also the equivalient to the predictions derived from a collapse.
Yes, but what if a memory is created and then destroyed?
If the memory of an observer is destroyed before its measurements can be deduced, then the model doesn’t have any measurement records (ie, no predictions).