But I do make the point that the problem here is one of fashion
No, you make the point that a different problem from the one Jack and I were commenting on is one of fashion. (The silliness of this when taken as a serious response is why I thought you might merely be making a joke and not also trying to make a serious point.)
You are wrong when it comes to “Wrong Question”.
I’m willing to be convinced, but the mere fact that you say this doesn’t convince me. (I think there are two separate common uses, actually. If you say someone is asking the wrong question, you mean that there’s a right question they should be asking and the one they’ve asked is a distraction from it. If you say they’re asking a wrong question, you mean the question itself is wrongheaded—typically because of a false assumption—and no answer to it is going to be informative rather than confusing.)
What do you think Pei Wang would have taken “a wrong question” to mean without the hyperlink, and how does it differ from what you think it actually means, and would the difference really have impaired the discussion?
I’m going to guess at your answer (in the hope of streamlining the discussion): the difference is that Eliezer’s article about wrong questions talks specifically about questions that can be “dissolved by understanding the cognitive algorithm that generates the perception of a question”, as opposed to ones where all there is to understand is that there’s an untrue presupposition. Except that in the very first example Eliezer gives of a “wrong question”—the purely definitional if-a-tree-falls sort of question—what you need to understand that the question is wrongheaded isn’t a cognitive algorithm, it’s just the fact that sometimes language is ambiguous and what looks like a question of fact is merely a question of definition. Which philosophers (and others) have been pointing out for decades—possibly centuries.
But let’s stipulate for the sake of argument that I’ve misunderstood, and Eliezer really did intend “wrong question” to apply only to questions for which the right response is to understand the cognitive algorithms that make it feel as if there’s a question, and that Luke had that specific meaning in mind. Then would removing the hyperlink have made an appreciable difference to how Pei Wang would have understood Luke’s words? Nope, because he was only giving an example, and the more general meaning of the word is an example—indeed, substantially the same example—of the same thing.
Anyway, enough! -- at least for me. (Feel free to have the last word.)
[EDITED to add: If whoever downvoted this would care to say why, I’ll be grateful. Did I say something stupid? Was I needlessly rude? Do you just want this whole discussion to stop?]
No, you make the point that a different problem from the one Jack and I were commenting on is one of fashion. (The silliness of this when taken as a serious response is why I thought you might merely be making a joke and not also trying to make a serious point.)
I’m willing to be convinced, but the mere fact that you say this doesn’t convince me. (I think there are two separate common uses, actually. If you say someone is asking the wrong question, you mean that there’s a right question they should be asking and the one they’ve asked is a distraction from it. If you say they’re asking a wrong question, you mean the question itself is wrongheaded—typically because of a false assumption—and no answer to it is going to be informative rather than confusing.)
What do you think Pei Wang would have taken “a wrong question” to mean without the hyperlink, and how does it differ from what you think it actually means, and would the difference really have impaired the discussion?
I’m going to guess at your answer (in the hope of streamlining the discussion): the difference is that Eliezer’s article about wrong questions talks specifically about questions that can be “dissolved by understanding the cognitive algorithm that generates the perception of a question”, as opposed to ones where all there is to understand is that there’s an untrue presupposition. Except that in the very first example Eliezer gives of a “wrong question”—the purely definitional if-a-tree-falls sort of question—what you need to understand that the question is wrongheaded isn’t a cognitive algorithm, it’s just the fact that sometimes language is ambiguous and what looks like a question of fact is merely a question of definition. Which philosophers (and others) have been pointing out for decades—possibly centuries.
But let’s stipulate for the sake of argument that I’ve misunderstood, and Eliezer really did intend “wrong question” to apply only to questions for which the right response is to understand the cognitive algorithms that make it feel as if there’s a question, and that Luke had that specific meaning in mind. Then would removing the hyperlink have made an appreciable difference to how Pei Wang would have understood Luke’s words? Nope, because he was only giving an example, and the more general meaning of the word is an example—indeed, substantially the same example—of the same thing.
Anyway, enough! -- at least for me. (Feel free to have the last word.)
[EDITED to add: If whoever downvoted this would care to say why, I’ll be grateful. Did I say something stupid? Was I needlessly rude? Do you just want this whole discussion to stop?]