224 comments, no citations/references to existing mechanism design research on these problems, What happened tho EY’s virtue of scholarship?
Excuses, justification, reason, rationality, rationalisation—perhaps they’re just synonyms.
At the end of the day they’re just language associated with an entity, that may or may not correlate with their behaviour.
In all these stories, the first party wants to credibly pre-commit to a rule, but also has incentives to forgive other people’s deviations from the rule. The second party breaks the rules, but comes up with an excuse for why its infraction should be forgiven.
The general principle is that by accepting an excuse, a rule-maker is also committing themselves to accepting all equally good excuses in the future. There are some exceptions—accepting an excuse in private but making sure no one else ever knows, accepting an excuse once with the express condition that you will never accept any other excuses—but to some degree these are devil’s bargains, as anyone who can predict you will do this can take advantage of you.
There are no general, dominant solutions unless we can model the other player’s behaviour. That means certain game theoretic assumptions about their preferences, which can’t readily be applied to individuals without transportable translation behaviour game theoretic research.
224 comments, no citations/references to existing mechanism design research on these problems, What happened tho EY’s virtue of scholarship?
Excuses, justification, reason, rationality, rationalisation—perhaps they’re just synonyms.
At the end of the day they’re just language associated with an entity, that may or may not correlate with their behaviour.
There are no general, dominant solutions unless we can model the other player’s behaviour. That means certain game theoretic assumptions about their preferences, which can’t readily be applied to individuals without transportable translation behaviour game theoretic research.