There two ways to define what kinds of excuses “should” be “valid” for a given behavior: the deontological way (like the “ick” reaction in your comment), and the consequentialist way (how will people’s behavior change if society deems such-and-such excuse “valid”).
Now the deontological way has a big drawback: it’s impossible to argue intelligently about, as you have aptly demonstrated with the penis references and whatnot. Different people have different deontologies. Without adopting some flavor of consequentialism, we can never have a rational common ground to say that your deontological standards are “better” than mine, and everyone leaves with their opinions unchanged. This is why I prefer to start from the opposite side: try to evaluate only the consequences of icky decisions, not how awful their descriptions sound. It also helps check that my deontological instincts aren’t lying to me.
Without adopting some flavor of consequentialism, we can never have a rational common ground to say that your deontological standards are “better” than mine, and everyone leaves with their opinions unchanged.
With consequentialist ethics you instead wind up arguing over what your terminal values should be, which tends to be equally effective.
But you have the additional recourse of evidence as to likely consequences, which is often revealed to be the source of disagreements that seem fundamental to a deontologist.
There two ways to define what kinds of excuses “should” be “valid” for a given behavior: the deontological way (like the “ick” reaction in your comment), and the consequentialist way (how will people’s behavior change if society deems such-and-such excuse “valid”).
Now the deontological way has a big drawback: it’s impossible to argue intelligently about, as you have aptly demonstrated with the penis references and whatnot. Different people have different deontologies. Without adopting some flavor of consequentialism, we can never have a rational common ground to say that your deontological standards are “better” than mine, and everyone leaves with their opinions unchanged. This is why I prefer to start from the opposite side: try to evaluate only the consequences of icky decisions, not how awful their descriptions sound. It also helps check that my deontological instincts aren’t lying to me.
With consequentialist ethics you instead wind up arguing over what your terminal values should be, which tends to be equally effective.
But you have the additional recourse of evidence as to likely consequences, which is often revealed to be the source of disagreements that seem fundamental to a deontologist.
Yes.
I would add that the deontological way has an even bigger drawback: it doesn’t reliably get you the consequences you want.
Yes, but if you’re really a deontologist, you shouldn’t care. ;)
We’re allowed to care. That sort of caring just doesn’t go in the “morality” box.