Ethical. If I wouldn’t want people torturing dogs, I have no justification to be okay with people torturing cows, pigs, and chickens
Dogs are genetically selected for living together with humans. As such, and unlike their wolf predecessors, dogs are friendly towards us. In many cases, care is reciprocal, in that we more often care about people who care about us. I propose that chickens don’t have even the slightest sense of morality, and don’t care whether their siblings live or die. With this in mind, I think it’s a somewhat justified to torture birds and low mammals, since they don’t care about our or their families’ well-being to begin with.
However, I would never torture a chicken unless I was at least 99% sure it had valuable information, and the future of the farm was at stake.
Kin selection suggests that chickens may care about their siblings, and general evolution suggests they definitely care about their children.
...which is exactly the problem. You sound like you’re holding a grudge against chickens for not being evolutionarily programmed in a certain way. Let it go. If you set some criteria for “deserving” our respect, of course a lot of animals can’t live up to it. But it doesn’t seem right to use that as justification for hurting them.
Thought experiment: I take Bob and cut out the part of his brain involved in empathy. Now he can’t care about other people, but his thought and emotions are otherwise intact. Is it now okay to torture Bob?
Kin selection suggests that chickens may care about their siblings, and general evolution suggests they definitely care about their children.
What I meant is that birds’ programming doesn’t feature advanced mental concepts like “care”, but simple instinctive responses (that can be easily triggered with false stimuli) take their place. However, I see now that this was not important to my point, and I could have left it out, in place of “don’t care whether other species live or die”.
If you set some criteria for “deserving” our respect, of course a lot of animals can’t live up to it. But it doesn’t seem right to use that as justification for hurting them.
What’s so inherently bad about pain? Is it morally questionable to run a piece of control software for a cleaning robot, that has a “const bool in_pain = true;”?
Now he can’t care about other people, but his thought and emotions are otherwise intact. Is it now okay to torture Bob?
With his intelligence intact, he can still be valuable to us, and depending on what he did in the past, we may be in moral debt to him. However, if he was born with no mental facilities outside of those of a chicken, my foremost reason for keeping him alive would be to prevent an emotional impact for other people.
The proper way to prove that pain is bad is proof by induction: specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
Is it morally questionable to run a piece of control software for a cleaning robot, that has a “const bool in_pain = true;”?
This is getting into the subject of qualia, which I freely admit to not understanding. But I’m pretty sure I have some, and I’m pretty sure they’re harder to produce than a variable with the label “pain”.
With his intelligence intact, he can still be valuable to us, and depending on what he did in the past, we may be in moral debt to him.
I’d guess from this statement that you’re either not a consequentialist, or you’re some exotic type of consequentialist straight out of Alicorn’s syllabus. If you clarify exactly what your moral theory is, I can give you a better estimate on how likely we are to be talking past each other because we have completely different premises.
specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
Hmm. Methinks this strategy could make debating female creationists somewhat problematic.
I already agree that (involuntary) pain for humans is bad, but I don’t think it’s bad in general, i.e. applied to any entity. For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole. They don’t have my sympathy, although I am grateful.
I am a consequentialist. However, if I see someone returning good favors with torture, I would not have any dealings with that person, since it would seem like a really bad investment.
For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole.
I don’t think it’s obvious that individual cells meaningfully experience pain, in the qualia-type sense we seem to be talking about. Qualia are a function of minds, not brains, or brain-pieces.
Dogs are genetically selected for living together with humans. As such, and unlike their wolf predecessors, dogs are friendly towards us. In many cases, care is reciprocal, in that we more often care about people who care about us. I propose that chickens don’t have even the slightest sense of morality, and don’t care whether their siblings live or die. With this in mind, I think it’s a somewhat justified to torture birds and low mammals, since they don’t care about our or their families’ well-being to begin with.
However, I would never torture a chicken unless I was at least 99% sure it had valuable information, and the future of the farm was at stake.
Kin selection suggests that chickens may care about their siblings, and general evolution suggests they definitely care about their children.
...which is exactly the problem. You sound like you’re holding a grudge against chickens for not being evolutionarily programmed in a certain way. Let it go. If you set some criteria for “deserving” our respect, of course a lot of animals can’t live up to it. But it doesn’t seem right to use that as justification for hurting them.
Thought experiment: I take Bob and cut out the part of his brain involved in empathy. Now he can’t care about other people, but his thought and emotions are otherwise intact. Is it now okay to torture Bob?
What I meant is that birds’ programming doesn’t feature advanced mental concepts like “care”, but simple instinctive responses (that can be easily triggered with false stimuli) take their place. However, I see now that this was not important to my point, and I could have left it out, in place of “don’t care whether other species live or die”.
What’s so inherently bad about pain? Is it morally questionable to run a piece of control software for a cleaning robot, that has a “const bool in_pain = true;”?
With his intelligence intact, he can still be valuable to us, and depending on what he did in the past, we may be in moral debt to him. However, if he was born with no mental facilities outside of those of a chicken, my foremost reason for keeping him alive would be to prevent an emotional impact for other people.
The proper way to prove that pain is bad is proof by induction: specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
This is getting into the subject of qualia, which I freely admit to not understanding. But I’m pretty sure I have some, and I’m pretty sure they’re harder to produce than a variable with the label “pain”.
I’d guess from this statement that you’re either not a consequentialist, or you’re some exotic type of consequentialist straight out of Alicorn’s syllabus. If you clarify exactly what your moral theory is, I can give you a better estimate on how likely we are to be talking past each other because we have completely different premises.
Hmm. Methinks this strategy could make debating female creationists somewhat problematic.
I already agree that (involuntary) pain for humans is bad, but I don’t think it’s bad in general, i.e. applied to any entity. For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole. They don’t have my sympathy, although I am grateful.
I am a consequentialist. However, if I see someone returning good favors with torture, I would not have any dealings with that person, since it would seem like a really bad investment.
I don’t think it’s obvious that individual cells meaningfully experience pain, in the qualia-type sense we seem to be talking about. Qualia are a function of minds, not brains, or brain-pieces.