it’s only equivalent for someone who rejects the doing-allowing distinction to an extreme degree
This suggests that the consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist distinction might actually the right one after all. (Of course, the claim that only consequentialists act in ways that are broadly consistent with their values is still, er… contentious, to say the least.)
Not at all! Consequentialists can get doing-allowing distinctions via self-other asymmetries or agent relativization, and non-consequentialists don’t have to embrace the distinction.
Fair enough. I tend to code self-other asymmetry and agent-relativization as non-consequentialist, even though they can be formally treated as such; but that’s admittedly a matter of (potentially idiosyncratic) taste. (I worry that otherwise consequentialism doesn’t uniquely identify anything; perhaps such fears are unwarranted.) Your second point is of course valid either way.
This suggests that the consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist distinction might actually the right one after all. (Of course, the claim that only consequentialists act in ways that are broadly consistent with their values is still, er… contentious, to say the least.)
Not at all! Consequentialists can get doing-allowing distinctions via self-other asymmetries or agent relativization, and non-consequentialists don’t have to embrace the distinction.
Fair enough. I tend to code self-other asymmetry and agent-relativization as non-consequentialist, even though they can be formally treated as such; but that’s admittedly a matter of (potentially idiosyncratic) taste. (I worry that otherwise consequentialism doesn’t uniquely identify anything; perhaps such fears are unwarranted.) Your second point is of course valid either way.