This doesn’t really answer the question on which empirical data the claim is based. Some further points:
Suicidal behavior or ideation are a diagnostic criterion for severe depression. If someone is identified as suicidal, that fact alone is likely to get them diagnosed as depressed. This reduces the usefulness of the depression classification to decide whether a particular suicide is a good or bad idea.
The treatability of depression, as defined by the likelihood that you eventually get these people to claim they’re better, doesn’t tell me how much they suffered before getting to this point, whether they would voluntarily go through it again to survive, and what their future risks of recidivism are.
There are probably selection effects as to who reports what in a salient manner. Given that suicidal people can be involuntarily hospitalized, honesty under threats of such forced treatment is less likely. As for cases salient in the media, I expect strong selection effects based on society’s desire to hear about happy endings, rather than a felicific analysis that may turn out negative. You don’t go on TV and say you wish you’d died 10 years ago, leaving your family behind. I expect people both to lie and to be selected for their willingness to lie about this.
Finally, people can simply be wrong about their total distribution of wellbeing. You are miserable for years, then get better, and in hindsight it becomes a blur. This doesn’t tell me that the total quality of life beyond the suicidal point is something I would want, or force onto someone, or even recommend to someone.
The treatability of depression, as defined by the likelihood that you eventually get these people to claim they’re better, doesn’t tell me how much they suffered before getting to this point, whether they would voluntarily go through it again to survive, and what their future risks of recidivism are.
However much they suffered before that point, and whether they would go through it again to survive, are not relevant points to whether they should be glad that they didn’t die. They’re sunk costs. A person might be tortured, and have a long life of good quality afterwards (data point, John McCain,) and it’s possible that they would not be willing to go through torture again to survive, but this doesn’t mean that they won’t be glad that after they were tortured, they didn’t die, even though they might have killed themselves to escape the torture if they could.
There’s certainly a possibility of biased reporting among people who report their quality of life and whether they’re glad they’re alive among people who’ve formerly attempted suicide, but then, that possibility exists among everyone, since whether you’ve attempted suicide before or not you’re still subject to social stigma if you admit to wanting to die.
As it happens, I know quite a lot of people who’ve attempted suicide. Of those, all of them currently appear to have qualities of life that are fair to good. In fact, one of the apparently happiest people I know attempted suicide about a decade ago. It’s possible that these people are systematically misrepresenting themselves to avoid social stigma, but at this point you’d be starting to get into invisible dragon depression territory.
However much they suffered before that point, and whether they would go through it again to survive, are not relevant points to whether they should be glad that they didn’t die. They’re sunk costs.
Subtle distinction: A person’s being glad that they are currently alive is not the same thing as their being better off, in total, by not having died at an earlier point X. This is relevant because the central argument for non-consensual suicide intervention is pointing out the former as evidence for the latter—incorrectly, I think. From the perspective of imminent suicide and its possible prevention, the intermittent suffering before eventual (potential) recovery is not a sunk cost yet!
I never said in the first place that most people who survived suicide are better off than they would be if they had died at an earlier point. This is a different question, but also one that people in suicidally depressive states are particularly unqualified to answer.
That said, I think it’s entirely appropriate to regard the former as evidence for the latter. If self reporting that one’s life has seemed worth living is not evidence that will sway one in favor of thinking that the person was better off alive than dead, what would be?
I agree it’s a piece of Bayesian evidence, but I wouldn’t treat it as conclusive. I don’t see that an observer who happens to come across a suicidal person is better qualified to judge the rationality of their decision than the suicidal person. The depressed states are often identified via the suicidality alone, which makes it worthless for judging the decision in the absense of other evidence. I would certainly talk someone off the ledge if I thought they were harming others, or they’re clearly hallucinating, or if I knew them enough to know they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life. However, I would not override someone’s decision in the absence of such information, because that may greatly harm them.
I do think that the self-reported suicidality is at least as much evidence against the value of a life as the general statistical restrospective self-reporting of being glad to be alive of formerly suicidal people is evidence for the value of a life. As an observer without further knowledge, I don’t see intervention as justified.
The world doesn’t lose much if a comparatively small number of individual people choose to die, but it loses much freedom if everyone is deprived of the right to make this decision. But alas, “every human being is infinitely valuable” is a nice-sounding meme that can trump such rational considerations in public opinion.
I would certainly talk someone off the ledge if I thought they were harming others, or they’re clearly hallucinating, or if I knew them enough to know they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life.
That they’re attempting suicide is strong Bayesian evidence that they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life. People who attempt to do so without other symptoms of depression are very much in the minority.
That they’re attempting suicide is strong Bayesian evidence that they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life.
This conclusion isn’t clear to me. You could certainly argue that, since they had not yet committed suicide before, their current suicidailty is unrepresentative. But of course there are many practical or psychological reasons to delay a suicide decision, and suicidal ideation can very well be a time-stable pattern in a person’s general outlook on life, long before that person actually decides to physically execute the deed. This is compatible with the presence of other symptoms of depression; in that case the quality of life is reduced by the depression and/or the depression is a product of a generally low quality of life (e.g. caused by a combination of a genetic predisposition and stressors).
The point here is that even for a depressed person, suicide can be rational. The depression itself is a reductive factor in their quality of life, and we have already established that we do not have a solid way of predicting that any particular person will be better off surviving than committing suicide at any given point in time. Only if I thought that the current emotional state isn’t representing the general quality of life baseline—which can include a depressive disposition—would I try to prevent the suicide. Examples could be days of emotional turmoil after a breakup, or similar temporary outliers.
The reason why this discussion is relevant is that this exact rationale is used to justify what I consider severe human rights violations, namely the involuntary hospitalization and medication of cognitively functional individuals who rejected the treatment. It is quite clear to me that this is an attack on individual self-determination that strips people of their last resort of hedonistic quality control and therefore does significantly more harm than good.
Those are my last thoughts in this discussion; thank you for the interaction.
I agree that suicide can sometimes be rational, but I think you severely overestimate the frequency with which it’s safe to assume this. Of the three people I know who have been involuntarily hospitalized for suicidal tendencies, all of them ended up glad of it, and none of them attempted suicide in response to recent negative experiences.
Allowing people self-determination may be a good general heuristic for increasing utility, but I think that this is a situation where, with limited information, we are usually best off defying that heuristic. There will almost certainly be cases where this prolongs the life of people who would be better off dead, but this has to be weighed against the people whose lives are worth living which would otherwise be lost, and I think we have adequate evidence to conclude that they’re far greater in number.
Those are my last thoughts on this matter as well.
This doesn’t really answer the question on which empirical data the claim is based. Some further points:
Suicidal behavior or ideation are a diagnostic criterion for severe depression. If someone is identified as suicidal, that fact alone is likely to get them diagnosed as depressed. This reduces the usefulness of the depression classification to decide whether a particular suicide is a good or bad idea.
The treatability of depression, as defined by the likelihood that you eventually get these people to claim they’re better, doesn’t tell me how much they suffered before getting to this point, whether they would voluntarily go through it again to survive, and what their future risks of recidivism are.
There are probably selection effects as to who reports what in a salient manner. Given that suicidal people can be involuntarily hospitalized, honesty under threats of such forced treatment is less likely. As for cases salient in the media, I expect strong selection effects based on society’s desire to hear about happy endings, rather than a felicific analysis that may turn out negative. You don’t go on TV and say you wish you’d died 10 years ago, leaving your family behind. I expect people both to lie and to be selected for their willingness to lie about this.
Finally, people can simply be wrong about their total distribution of wellbeing. You are miserable for years, then get better, and in hindsight it becomes a blur. This doesn’t tell me that the total quality of life beyond the suicidal point is something I would want, or force onto someone, or even recommend to someone.
More arguments or empirical data?
However much they suffered before that point, and whether they would go through it again to survive, are not relevant points to whether they should be glad that they didn’t die. They’re sunk costs. A person might be tortured, and have a long life of good quality afterwards (data point, John McCain,) and it’s possible that they would not be willing to go through torture again to survive, but this doesn’t mean that they won’t be glad that after they were tortured, they didn’t die, even though they might have killed themselves to escape the torture if they could.
There’s certainly a possibility of biased reporting among people who report their quality of life and whether they’re glad they’re alive among people who’ve formerly attempted suicide, but then, that possibility exists among everyone, since whether you’ve attempted suicide before or not you’re still subject to social stigma if you admit to wanting to die.
As it happens, I know quite a lot of people who’ve attempted suicide. Of those, all of them currently appear to have qualities of life that are fair to good. In fact, one of the apparently happiest people I know attempted suicide about a decade ago. It’s possible that these people are systematically misrepresenting themselves to avoid social stigma, but at this point you’d be starting to get into invisible dragon depression territory.
Subtle distinction: A person’s being glad that they are currently alive is not the same thing as their being better off, in total, by not having died at an earlier point X. This is relevant because the central argument for non-consensual suicide intervention is pointing out the former as evidence for the latter—incorrectly, I think. From the perspective of imminent suicide and its possible prevention, the intermittent suffering before eventual (potential) recovery is not a sunk cost yet!
I never said in the first place that most people who survived suicide are better off than they would be if they had died at an earlier point. This is a different question, but also one that people in suicidally depressive states are particularly unqualified to answer.
That said, I think it’s entirely appropriate to regard the former as evidence for the latter. If self reporting that one’s life has seemed worth living is not evidence that will sway one in favor of thinking that the person was better off alive than dead, what would be?
I agree it’s a piece of Bayesian evidence, but I wouldn’t treat it as conclusive. I don’t see that an observer who happens to come across a suicidal person is better qualified to judge the rationality of their decision than the suicidal person. The depressed states are often identified via the suicidality alone, which makes it worthless for judging the decision in the absense of other evidence. I would certainly talk someone off the ledge if I thought they were harming others, or they’re clearly hallucinating, or if I knew them enough to know they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life. However, I would not override someone’s decision in the absence of such information, because that may greatly harm them.
I do think that the self-reported suicidality is at least as much evidence against the value of a life as the general statistical restrospective self-reporting of being glad to be alive of formerly suicidal people is evidence for the value of a life. As an observer without further knowledge, I don’t see intervention as justified.
The world doesn’t lose much if a comparatively small number of individual people choose to die, but it loses much freedom if everyone is deprived of the right to make this decision. But alas, “every human being is infinitely valuable” is a nice-sounding meme that can trump such rational considerations in public opinion.
That they’re attempting suicide is strong Bayesian evidence that they’re not in a representative emotional state for their general outlook on life. People who attempt to do so without other symptoms of depression are very much in the minority.
This conclusion isn’t clear to me. You could certainly argue that, since they had not yet committed suicide before, their current suicidailty is unrepresentative. But of course there are many practical or psychological reasons to delay a suicide decision, and suicidal ideation can very well be a time-stable pattern in a person’s general outlook on life, long before that person actually decides to physically execute the deed. This is compatible with the presence of other symptoms of depression; in that case the quality of life is reduced by the depression and/or the depression is a product of a generally low quality of life (e.g. caused by a combination of a genetic predisposition and stressors).
The point here is that even for a depressed person, suicide can be rational. The depression itself is a reductive factor in their quality of life, and we have already established that we do not have a solid way of predicting that any particular person will be better off surviving than committing suicide at any given point in time. Only if I thought that the current emotional state isn’t representing the general quality of life baseline—which can include a depressive disposition—would I try to prevent the suicide. Examples could be days of emotional turmoil after a breakup, or similar temporary outliers.
The reason why this discussion is relevant is that this exact rationale is used to justify what I consider severe human rights violations, namely the involuntary hospitalization and medication of cognitively functional individuals who rejected the treatment. It is quite clear to me that this is an attack on individual self-determination that strips people of their last resort of hedonistic quality control and therefore does significantly more harm than good.
Those are my last thoughts in this discussion; thank you for the interaction.
I agree that suicide can sometimes be rational, but I think you severely overestimate the frequency with which it’s safe to assume this. Of the three people I know who have been involuntarily hospitalized for suicidal tendencies, all of them ended up glad of it, and none of them attempted suicide in response to recent negative experiences.
Allowing people self-determination may be a good general heuristic for increasing utility, but I think that this is a situation where, with limited information, we are usually best off defying that heuristic. There will almost certainly be cases where this prolongs the life of people who would be better off dead, but this has to be weighed against the people whose lives are worth living which would otherwise be lost, and I think we have adequate evidence to conclude that they’re far greater in number.
Those are my last thoughts on this matter as well.