If R doesn’t choose A=..., great! We’re done; R doesn’t have goal G.
I’m not sure we can draw this conclusion from the model you’ve given. Instead it feels to me like there is a missing assumption that’s not spelled out in the math. Something that would allow us to say that this choice reveals something about R’s relationship to G. Possibly some detail about how R operates, although I realize that’s what you’re trying to discover via this method. My guess is that you’re going to run into something like a NFL theorem that prevents you from doing what you want to do (see https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05812 for a relevant example in a slightly different domain).
I’d of course be happy to be proven wrong, as in I think you need a proof showing you can do what you want to do and why I can’t draw some other conclusion as Vaniver suggests.
Thank you for the link, it seems like an interesting result. The kind of proof that you’d like, purporting to show that a mathematical model is ‘always’ applicable to a real world situation, is surely nigh-impossible. If I try to summarise your main objection: the paper you linked to is a form of a ‘partial’ no go theorem for IRL; and you think it might be likely that there are very general No Go Theorems which would apply to any possible implementation of theoretical models of agency. This is of course possible, but I find it unlikely; in the real world humans are able to discern agency. No doubt there are many hidden assumptions and subtleties but I think it shouldn’t stop us from trying to understand intention&agency in highly simplified situations.
In the model this is simply stated as given; we are trying to define intention; it might be that this definition does not accord to your intuitions about intention, but inside the model one cannot reject the conclusion. Of course, someone might come along and might come up with a more sophisticated model that has even more subtle distinctions. I look forward to such a model.
In danger of repeating myself, I cannot ‘prove’ that I can do what I can do. There is simply a model, which might be accurate in some respects and inaccurate in others; in the model one can do whatever one likes (following the rules of the model); applying it to the real world is trickier. As stated earlier there are many situations where the exact implementation is ambiguous or needs extra-theoretic assumptions. This is normal and occurs all over science. Galileo’s results can be objected to in individual situations by referring to all kinds of contingencies like air resistance etc. Indeed, I have heard it said -but cannot confirm- that one Jesuit scholar refused to look through the telescope when Galileo founds the moons of Jupiter, objecting to possible smudges on the telescope. I think you will agree that Galileo’s perspective was more productive then that of the Jesuit scholar, even though of course Galileo couldn’t prove that his model was applicable [the fact that the moons weren’t smudges on the telescope is one of those extra-theoretical assumptions].
It is clear that explications are somehow bouncing off, as (it seems) you are the second person to object in this manner. Perhaps the nomenclature ‘experiment’ was ill-begotten.
EDIT: The story about Galileo is almost certainly false; see Gignoramus
I’m not sure we can draw this conclusion from the model you’ve given. Instead it feels to me like there is a missing assumption that’s not spelled out in the math. Something that would allow us to say that this choice reveals something about R’s relationship to G. Possibly some detail about how R operates, although I realize that’s what you’re trying to discover via this method. My guess is that you’re going to run into something like a NFL theorem that prevents you from doing what you want to do (see https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05812 for a relevant example in a slightly different domain).
I’d of course be happy to be proven wrong, as in I think you need a proof showing you can do what you want to do and why I can’t draw some other conclusion as Vaniver suggests.
Dear gworley,
Thank you for the link, it seems like an interesting result. The kind of proof that you’d like, purporting to show that a mathematical model is ‘always’ applicable to a real world situation, is surely nigh-impossible. If I try to summarise your main objection: the paper you linked to is a form of a ‘partial’ no go theorem for IRL; and you think it might be likely that there are very general No Go Theorems which would apply to any possible implementation of theoretical models of agency. This is of course possible, but I find it unlikely; in the real world humans are able to discern agency. No doubt there are many hidden assumptions and subtleties but I think it shouldn’t stop us from trying to understand intention&agency in highly simplified situations.
In the model this is simply stated as given; we are trying to define intention; it might be that this definition does not accord to your intuitions about intention, but inside the model one cannot reject the conclusion. Of course, someone might come along and might come up with a more sophisticated model that has even more subtle distinctions. I look forward to such a model.
In danger of repeating myself, I cannot ‘prove’ that I can do what I can do. There is simply a model, which might be accurate in some respects and inaccurate in others; in the model one can do whatever one likes (following the rules of the model); applying it to the real world is trickier. As stated earlier there are many situations where the exact implementation is ambiguous or needs extra-theoretic assumptions. This is normal and occurs all over science. Galileo’s results can be objected to in individual situations by referring to all kinds of contingencies like air resistance etc. Indeed, I have heard it said -but cannot confirm- that one Jesuit scholar refused to look through the telescope when Galileo founds the moons of Jupiter, objecting to possible smudges on the telescope. I think you will agree that Galileo’s perspective was more productive then that of the Jesuit scholar, even though of course Galileo couldn’t prove that his model was applicable [the fact that the moons weren’t smudges on the telescope is one of those extra-theoretical assumptions].
It is clear that explications are somehow bouncing off, as (it seems) you are the second person to object in this manner. Perhaps the nomenclature ‘experiment’ was ill-begotten.
EDIT: The story about Galileo is almost certainly false; see Gignoramus