There are two things you can do with Newcomb’s Problem. One is to outline arguments for one-boxing and two-boxing, along with whether and why they control your actual decision. This is mainly a formal, logical problem, though you can make illogical arguments too. This argument as a whole is in this category.
The other is to make a prediction about whether, in this scenario, you would take one box or two, and what would motivate that choice in the moment. These are questions about your personal psychology.
Underlying Newcomb’s Problem, then, lurks the is-ought problem.
Underlying Newcomb’s Problem, then, lurks the is-ought problem.
It’s interesting that you say this. I’ve been thinking a lot about what counterfactuals are at their base and one of the possibilities I’ve been considering is that maybe we can’t provide an objective answer due to the is-ought problem.
There are two things you can do with Newcomb’s Problem. One is to outline arguments for one-boxing and two-boxing, along with whether and why they control your actual decision. This is mainly a formal, logical problem, though you can make illogical arguments too. This argument as a whole is in this category.
The other is to make a prediction about whether, in this scenario, you would take one box or two, and what would motivate that choice in the moment. These are questions about your personal psychology.
Underlying Newcomb’s Problem, then, lurks the is-ought problem.
It’s interesting that you say this. I’ve been thinking a lot about what counterfactuals are at their base and one of the possibilities I’ve been considering is that maybe we can’t provide an objective answer due to the is-ought problem.