My interest in rationality was more driven by my interest in effective altruism than the other way around.
This comment actually makes aspects of your writings here make sense, that did not make sense to me before.
Your post, overall, seems to have the assumption underlying it, that effective altruism is rational, and obviously so. I am not convinced this is the case (at the very least, not the “and obviously so” part).
To the extent that effective altruism is anything like a “movement”, a “philosophy”, a “community”, or really, anything less trivial than “well, altruism seems like the way to go, and we should be effective at things”, it seems to me to need some justification, some arguing-for. I’ve not seen a whole lot of that. (Perhaps I have missed it.) I’ve not even seen a whole lot of really clear definitions, statements of purpose, or laying out of views.
So, do you happen to have a link handy, to something like a “this is what effective altruism is, and here’s why it’s a good idea, and obviously so”? (If not, then you might consider writing such a thing.)
My post does carry the connotation “whether or not people engage in effective altruism is significant,” but I didn’t mean for it to carry the connotation that effective altruism is rational – on the contrary, that’s the very question that I’m exploring :-) (albeit from the opposite end of the telescope).
For an introduction to effective altruism, you could check out:
I’ve read Yvain’s article, and reread it just now. It has the same underlying problem, which is: to the extent that it’s obviously true, it’s trivial[1]; to the extent that it’s nontrivial, it’s not obviously true.
Yvain talks about how we should be effective in the charity we choose to engage in (no big revelation here), then seems almost imperceptibly to slide into an assumed worldview where we’re all utilitarians, where saving children is, of course, what we care about most, where the best charity is the one that saves the most children, etc.
To what extent are all of these things part of what “effective altruism” is? For instance (and this is just one possible example), let’s say I really care about paintings more than dead children, and think that £550,000 paid to keep one mediocre painting in a UK museum is money quite well spent, even when the matter of sanitation in African villages is put to me as bluntly as you like; but I aspire to rationality, and want to purchase my artwork-retention-by-local-museums as cost-effectively as I can. Am I an effective altruist?
To put this another way: if “effective altruism” is really just “we should be effective in our altruistic actions”, then it seems frankly ridiculous that less than one-third of Less Wrong readers should identify as EA-ers. What do the other 71.4% think? That we should be ineffective altruists?? That altruism in general is just a bad idea? Do those two views really account for over seventy percent of the LW readership, do you think? Surely, in this case, the effective altruist movement just really needs to get better at explaining itself, and its obvious and uncontroversial nature, to the Less Wrong audience.
But effective altruism isn’t just about that, yes? As a movement, as a philosophy, it’s got all sorts of baggage, in the form of fairly specific values and ethical systems (that are assumed, and never really argued for, by EA-ers), like (a specific form of) utilitarianism, belief in things like the moral value of animals, and certain other things. Or, at least — such is the perception of people around here (myself included); and that, I think, is what’s behind that 28.6% statistic.
[1] Well, trivial given the background that we, as Lesswrongians who have read and understood the Sequences, are assumed to have.
I haven’t watched that TED talk (though I’ve read some of Peter Singer’s writings); I will do that tomorrow.
Ok, I’ve watched Singer’s TED talk now, thank you for linking it. It does work as a statement of purpose, certainly. On the other hand it fails as an attempt to justify or argue for the movement’s core values; at the same time, it makes it quite clear that effective altruism is not just about “let’s be altruists effectively”. It’s got some specific values attached, more specific than can justifiably be called simply “altruism”.
I want to see, at least, some acknowledgment of that fact, and preferably, some attempt to defend those values. Singer doesn’t do this; he merely handwaves in the general direction of “empathy” and “a rational understanding of our situation” (note that he doesn’t explain what makes this particular set of values — valuing all lives equally — “rational”).
Edit: My apologies! I just looked over your post again, and noticed this line, which my brain somehow ignored at first:
I’d venture the guess its [the principle of indifference’s] popularity among rationalists is an artifact of culture or a selection effect rather than a consequence of rationality.
That (in fact, that whole paragraph) does go far toward addressing my concerns. Consider the objections in this comment at least partially withdrawn!
This comment actually makes aspects of your writings here make sense, that did not make sense to me before.
Your post, overall, seems to have the assumption underlying it, that effective altruism is rational, and obviously so. I am not convinced this is the case (at the very least, not the “and obviously so” part).
To the extent that effective altruism is anything like a “movement”, a “philosophy”, a “community”, or really, anything less trivial than “well, altruism seems like the way to go, and we should be effective at things”, it seems to me to need some justification, some arguing-for. I’ve not seen a whole lot of that. (Perhaps I have missed it.) I’ve not even seen a whole lot of really clear definitions, statements of purpose, or laying out of views.
So, do you happen to have a link handy, to something like a “this is what effective altruism is, and here’s why it’s a good idea, and obviously so”? (If not, then you might consider writing such a thing.)
My post does carry the connotation “whether or not people engage in effective altruism is significant,” but I didn’t mean for it to carry the connotation that effective altruism is rational – on the contrary, that’s the very question that I’m exploring :-) (albeit from the opposite end of the telescope).
For an introduction to effective altruism, you could check out:
Peter Singer’s TED talk
Yvain’s article Efficient Charity: Do Unto Others…
Are you familiar with them?
Thanks also, for the feedback.
I’ve read Yvain’s article, and reread it just now. It has the same underlying problem, which is: to the extent that it’s obviously true, it’s trivial[1]; to the extent that it’s nontrivial, it’s not obviously true.
Yvain talks about how we should be effective in the charity we choose to engage in (no big revelation here), then seems almost imperceptibly to slide into an assumed worldview where we’re all utilitarians, where saving children is, of course, what we care about most, where the best charity is the one that saves the most children, etc.
To what extent are all of these things part of what “effective altruism” is? For instance (and this is just one possible example), let’s say I really care about paintings more than dead children, and think that £550,000 paid to keep one mediocre painting in a UK museum is money quite well spent, even when the matter of sanitation in African villages is put to me as bluntly as you like; but I aspire to rationality, and want to purchase my artwork-retention-by-local-museums as cost-effectively as I can. Am I an effective altruist?
To put this another way: if “effective altruism” is really just “we should be effective in our altruistic actions”, then it seems frankly ridiculous that less than one-third of Less Wrong readers should identify as EA-ers. What do the other 71.4% think? That we should be ineffective altruists?? That altruism in general is just a bad idea? Do those two views really account for over seventy percent of the LW readership, do you think? Surely, in this case, the effective altruist movement just really needs to get better at explaining itself, and its obvious and uncontroversial nature, to the Less Wrong audience.
But effective altruism isn’t just about that, yes? As a movement, as a philosophy, it’s got all sorts of baggage, in the form of fairly specific values and ethical systems (that are assumed, and never really argued for, by EA-ers), like (a specific form of) utilitarianism, belief in things like the moral value of animals, and certain other things. Or, at least — such is the perception of people around here (myself included); and that, I think, is what’s behind that 28.6% statistic.
[1] Well, trivial given the background that we, as Lesswrongians who have read and understood the Sequences, are assumed to have.
I haven’t watched that TED talk (though I’ve read some of Peter Singer’s writings); I will do that tomorrow.
Ok, I’ve watched Singer’s TED talk now, thank you for linking it. It does work as a statement of purpose, certainly. On the other hand it fails as an attempt to justify or argue for the movement’s core values; at the same time, it makes it quite clear that effective altruism is not just about “let’s be altruists effectively”. It’s got some specific values attached, more specific than can justifiably be called simply “altruism”.
I want to see, at least, some acknowledgment of that fact, and preferably, some attempt to defend those values. Singer doesn’t do this; he merely handwaves in the general direction of “empathy” and “a rational understanding of our situation” (note that he doesn’t explain what makes this particular set of values — valuing all lives equally — “rational”).
Edit: My apologies! I just looked over your post again, and noticed this line, which my brain somehow ignored at first:
That (in fact, that whole paragraph) does go far toward addressing my concerns. Consider the objections in this comment at least partially withdrawn!
Apology accepted :-). (Don’t worry, I know that my post was long and that catching everything can require a lot of energy.)