Actually, the whole point of governments and legal systems [...] is to encourage cooperation between individuals [...] And specialization trivially depends upon cooperation.
I have my quibbles with the social contract theory of government, but my main objection here isn’t to the theory itself, but that you’re attributing features to it that it clearly isn’t responsible for. You don’t need post-apocalyptic chaos to find situations that social contracts don’t cover: for example, there is no social contract on the international stage (pre-superpower, if you’d prefer), but nations still specialize and make alliances and transfer value.
The point of government (and therefore the social contract, if you buy that theory of legitimacy) is to facilitate cooperation. You seem to be suggesting that it enables it, which is a different and much stronger claim.
I think that international relations is a simple extension of social-contract-like considerations.
If nations cooperate, it is because it is believed to be in their interest to do so. Social-contract-like considerations form the basis for that belief. (The social contract is simply that which makes it useful to cooperate.) “Clearly isn’t responsible for,” is a phrase you should be careful before using.
You seem to be suggesting that [government] enables [cooperation]
I guess you mean that I’m saying cooperation is impossible without government. I didn’t say that. Government is a form of cooperation. Albeit a highly sophisticated one, and a very powerful facilitator.
I have my quibbles with the social contract theory of government
I appreciate your frankness. I’m curious, do you have an alternative view of how government derives legitimacy? What is it that makes the rules and structure of society useful? Or do you think that government has no legitimacy?
If nations cooperate, it is because it is believed to be in their interest to do so. Social-contract-like considerations form the basis for that belief. (The social contract is simply that which makes it useful to cooperate.)
The social contract, according to Hobbes and its later proponents, is the implicit deal that citizens (and, at a logical extension, other subordinate entities) make with their governments, trading off some of their freedom of action for greater security and potentially the maintenance of certain rights. That implies some higher authority with compelling powers of enforcement, and there’s no such thing in international relations; it’s been described (indeed, by Hobbes himself) as a formalized anarchy. Using the phrase to describe the motives for cooperation in such a state extends it far beyond its original sense, and IMO beyond usefulness.
There are however other reasons to cooperate: status, self-enforced codes of ethics, enlightened self-interest. It’s these that dominate in international relations, which is why I brought that up.
I have my quibbles with the social contract theory of government, but my main objection here isn’t to the theory itself, but that you’re attributing features to it that it clearly isn’t responsible for. You don’t need post-apocalyptic chaos to find situations that social contracts don’t cover: for example, there is no social contract on the international stage (pre-superpower, if you’d prefer), but nations still specialize and make alliances and transfer value.
The point of government (and therefore the social contract, if you buy that theory of legitimacy) is to facilitate cooperation. You seem to be suggesting that it enables it, which is a different and much stronger claim.
I think that international relations is a simple extension of social-contract-like considerations.
If nations cooperate, it is because it is believed to be in their interest to do so. Social-contract-like considerations form the basis for that belief. (The social contract is simply that which makes it useful to cooperate.) “Clearly isn’t responsible for,” is a phrase you should be careful before using.
I guess you mean that I’m saying cooperation is impossible without government. I didn’t say that. Government is a form of cooperation. Albeit a highly sophisticated one, and a very powerful facilitator.
I appreciate your frankness. I’m curious, do you have an alternative view of how government derives legitimacy? What is it that makes the rules and structure of society useful? Or do you think that government has no legitimacy?
The social contract, according to Hobbes and its later proponents, is the implicit deal that citizens (and, at a logical extension, other subordinate entities) make with their governments, trading off some of their freedom of action for greater security and potentially the maintenance of certain rights. That implies some higher authority with compelling powers of enforcement, and there’s no such thing in international relations; it’s been described (indeed, by Hobbes himself) as a formalized anarchy. Using the phrase to describe the motives for cooperation in such a state extends it far beyond its original sense, and IMO beyond usefulness.
There are however other reasons to cooperate: status, self-enforced codes of ethics, enlightened self-interest. It’s these that dominate in international relations, which is why I brought that up.