Yes, LW exposure might easily dispose readers with those inclinations toward EA-like forms of political or religious advocacy, and if that’s all they’re doing then I wouldn’t call them effective altruists (though only because politics and religion are not generally considered forms of altruism). That doesn’t seem terribly relevant, though. Politics and religion are usually compatible with altruism, and nothing about effective altruism requires devotion solely to GiveWell-approved causes.
I’m really not sure what you’re trying to demonstrate here. Some people have values incompatible with EA’s assumptions? That’s true, but it only establishes the orthogonality of LW ideas with EA if everyone with compatible values was already an effective altruist, and that almost certainly isn’t the case. As far as I can tell there’s plenty of room for optimization.
(It does establish an upper bound, but EA’s market penetration, even after any possible LW influence, is nowhere near it.)
I’m really not sure what you’re trying to demonstrate here.
That rationality and altruism are orthogonal. That effective altruism is predominantly altruism and “effective” plays a second fiddle to it. That rationality does not imply altruism (in case you think it’s a strawman, tom_cr seems to claim exactly that).
If effective altruism was predominantly just altruism, we wouldn’t be seeing the kind of criticism of it from a traditionally philanthropic perspective that we have been. I see this as strong evidence that it’s something distinct, and therefore that it makes sense to talk about something like LW rationality methods bolstering it despite rationality’s silence on pure questions of values.
Yes, it’s just [a method of quantifying] effectiveness. But effectiveness in this context, approached in this particular manner, is more significant—and, perhaps more importantly, a lot less intuitive -- than I think you’re giving it credit for.
we wouldn’t be seeing the kind of criticism of it from a traditionally philanthropic perspective that we have been
I don’t know about that. First, EA is competition for the limited resource, the donors’ money, and even worse, EA keeps on telling others that they are doing it wrong. Second, the idea that charity money should be spend in effective ways is pretty uncontroversial. I suspect (that’s my prior adjustable by evidence) that most of the criticism is aimed at specific recommendations of GiveWell and others, not at the concept of being getting more bang for your buck.
Take a look at Bill Gates. He is explicitly concerned with the effectiveness and impact of his charity spending—to the degree that he decided to bypass most established nonprofits and set up his own operation. Is he a “traditional” or an “effective” altruist? I don’t know.
and, perhaps more importantly, a lot less intuitive
Yes, I grant you that. Traditional charity tends to rely on purely emotional appeals. But I don’t know if that’s enough to push EA into a separate category of its own.
Yes, LW exposure might easily dispose readers with those inclinations toward EA-like forms of political or religious advocacy, and if that’s all they’re doing then I wouldn’t call them effective altruists (though only because politics and religion are not generally considered forms of altruism). That doesn’t seem terribly relevant, though. Politics and religion are usually compatible with altruism, and nothing about effective altruism requires devotion solely to GiveWell-approved causes.
I’m really not sure what you’re trying to demonstrate here. Some people have values incompatible with EA’s assumptions? That’s true, but it only establishes the orthogonality of LW ideas with EA if everyone with compatible values was already an effective altruist, and that almost certainly isn’t the case. As far as I can tell there’s plenty of room for optimization.
(It does establish an upper bound, but EA’s market penetration, even after any possible LW influence, is nowhere near it.)
That rationality and altruism are orthogonal. That effective altruism is predominantly altruism and “effective” plays a second fiddle to it. That rationality does not imply altruism (in case you think it’s a strawman, tom_cr seems to claim exactly that).
If effective altruism was predominantly just altruism, we wouldn’t be seeing the kind of criticism of it from a traditionally philanthropic perspective that we have been. I see this as strong evidence that it’s something distinct, and therefore that it makes sense to talk about something like LW rationality methods bolstering it despite rationality’s silence on pure questions of values.
Yes, it’s just [a method of quantifying] effectiveness. But effectiveness in this context, approached in this particular manner, is more significant—and, perhaps more importantly, a lot less intuitive -- than I think you’re giving it credit for.
I don’t know about that. First, EA is competition for the limited resource, the donors’ money, and even worse, EA keeps on telling others that they are doing it wrong. Second, the idea that charity money should be spend in effective ways is pretty uncontroversial. I suspect (that’s my prior adjustable by evidence) that most of the criticism is aimed at specific recommendations of GiveWell and others, not at the concept of being getting more bang for your buck.
Take a look at Bill Gates. He is explicitly concerned with the effectiveness and impact of his charity spending—to the degree that he decided to bypass most established nonprofits and set up his own operation. Is he a “traditional” or an “effective” altruist? I don’t know.
Yes, I grant you that. Traditional charity tends to rely on purely emotional appeals. But I don’t know if that’s enough to push EA into a separate category of its own.