Altruism (depending how you define it) is a subset of rationality as long as the social contract is useful (ie nearly all the time).
Basing altruism on contractarianism is very different from basing altruism on empathy. For one thing, the results may be different (one might reasonably conclude that we, here in the United States or wherever, have no implicit social contract with the residents of e.g. Nigeria). For another, it’s one level removed from terminal values, whereas empathy is not, so it’s a different sort of reasoning, and not easily comparable.
(btw, I also think there’s a basic misunderstanding happening here, but I’ll let Lumifer address it, if he likes.)
Yes, non-rational (perhaps empathy-based) altruism is possible. This is connected to the point I made elsewhere that consequentialism does not axiomatically depend on others having value.
empathy is not [one level removed from terminal values]
Not sure what you mean here. Empathy may be a gazillion levels removed from the terminal level. Experiencing an emotion does not guarantee that that emotion is a faithful representation of a true value held. Otherwise “do exactly as you feel immediately inclined, at all times,” would be all we needed to know about morality.
Basing altruism on contractarianism is very different from basing altruism on empathy. For one thing, the results may be different (one might reasonably conclude that we, here in the United States or wherever, have no implicit social contract with the residents of e.g. Nigeria). For another, it’s one level removed from terminal values, whereas empathy is not, so it’s a different sort of reasoning, and not easily comparable.
(btw, I also think there’s a basic misunderstanding happening here, but I’ll let Lumifer address it, if he likes.)
Yes, non-rational (perhaps empathy-based) altruism is possible. This is connected to the point I made elsewhere that consequentialism does not axiomatically depend on others having value.
Not sure what you mean here. Empathy may be a gazillion levels removed from the terminal level. Experiencing an emotion does not guarantee that that emotion is a faithful representation of a true value held. Otherwise “do exactly as you feel immediately inclined, at all times,” would be all we needed to know about morality.