The opportunity for self-serving application of this principle casts a shadow over all applications.
[…]
Finally, when I look at the world, I see almost no-one who values others above themselves. What, then, will the CEV of humanity have to say on the subject?
I’m confused over what exactly your position is. The first bit I quoted seems to imply that you think that one should sacrifice everything in favor of altruism, whereas the second excerpt seems like a criticism of that position.
My position is that (1) the universal practice of valuing oneself over others is right and proper (and I expect others to rightly and properly value themselves over me, it being up to me to earn any above-baseline favour I may receive), (2) there is room for discussion about what base level of compassion one should have towards distant strangers (I certainly don’t put it at zero), and (3) I take the injunction to love one’s neighbour as oneself as a corrective to a too low level of (2) rather than as a literal requirement, a practical rule of thumb for debiasing rather than a moral axiom. Perfect altruism is not even what I would want to want.
The first bit I quoted seems to imply that you think that one should sacrifice everything in favor of altruism
I’m drawing out what I see as the implications of holding (which I don’t) that we ought to be perfectly altruistic, while finding (as I do) that in practice it is impossible. It leads, as you have found, to uneasy compromises guiltily taken.
I did say right in my original comment (emphasis added):
By going with the leisure budget argument, one is essentially admitting that cryonics isn’t about altruism, it’s about yourself. And of course, there is nothing wrong with that, since none of us is a 100% complete altruist who cares nothing about themselves, nor should we even try to idealize that kind of a person.
I will attempt a resolution: other people are as imortant as me, in pirncipal, since I am not objectively anything special—but I should concentrate my efforts on myself and those close to me, becuase I understand my and their needs better, and can therefore be more effective.
I don’t think that’s a sufficient or effective compromise. If I’m given a choice between saving the life of my child, or the lives of a 1000 other children, I will always save my child. And I will only feel guilt to the extent that I was unable to come up with a 3rd option that saves everybody.
I don’t do it for some indirect reason such as that I understand my children’s needs better or such. I do it because I value my own child’s life more, plain and simple.
You might as well have asked: special to whom>? Even if there is no objective importance or specialiness anywhere, it still follows that I have no objective importance ort specialness.
[…]
I’m confused over what exactly your position is. The first bit I quoted seems to imply that you think that one should sacrifice everything in favor of altruism, whereas the second excerpt seems like a criticism of that position.
My position is that (1) the universal practice of valuing oneself over others is right and proper (and I expect others to rightly and properly value themselves over me, it being up to me to earn any above-baseline favour I may receive), (2) there is room for discussion about what base level of compassion one should have towards distant strangers (I certainly don’t put it at zero), and (3) I take the injunction to love one’s neighbour as oneself as a corrective to a too low level of (2) rather than as a literal requirement, a practical rule of thumb for debiasing rather than a moral axiom. Perfect altruism is not even what I would want to want.
I’m drawing out what I see as the implications of holding (which I don’t) that we ought to be perfectly altruistic, while finding (as I do) that in practice it is impossible. It leads, as you have found, to uneasy compromises guiltily taken.
I did say right in my original comment (emphasis added):
I will attempt a resolution: other people are as imortant as me, in pirncipal, since I am not objectively anything special—but I should concentrate my efforts on myself and those close to me, becuase I understand my and their needs better, and can therefore be more effective.
I don’t think that’s a sufficient or effective compromise. If I’m given a choice between saving the life of my child, or the lives of a 1000 other children, I will always save my child. And I will only feel guilt to the extent that I was unable to come up with a 3rd option that saves everybody.
I don’t do it for some indirect reason such as that I understand my children’s needs better or such. I do it because I value my own child’s life more, plain and simple.
Important to whom?
You might as well have asked: special to whom>? Even if there is no objective importance or specialiness anywhere, it still follows that I have no objective importance ort specialness.