The first one is trusting that someone’s goals are aligned with mine, and that they don’t intentionally do anything bad.
The second one is trusting that someone’s actions are going to be lined up with their intentions, and that they will take the initiative to ensure this.
The second is much harder to earn, but can be earned without needing to necessarily have my goals.
From the outside, it’s not clear that we can do any better than saying that someone’s intentions are nearly always lined up with their actions. Or, to do better than that, we have to side with a part of them as their “true self”. But the idea that someone else’s goals are aligned with yours is nearly always going to be false except for some very limited set of goals.
I kind of thought it went without saying that atucker was talking about a limited set of goals being aligned?
As a shorthand I have always tended to look at trust on two levels, which seem similar to atucker’s but perhaps not the same? That is: I trust your intentions (in the relevant area), and I trust your competence (in that area). There’s also the issue of diligence, which is a kind of competence and also a kind of intention, so that can complicate things perhaps, but for simplicity I just look at it as two levels.
Well, that was what I meant at least. That it was a limited set of alignment.
Also, I’m pretty sure that most naive morality assumes that people have a true self that is being dealt with. Revealed preferences are a pretty new idea, if I understand correctly, and people tend to get annoyed and defensive when it’s brought up.
I have two standards of trust.
The first one is trusting that someone’s goals are aligned with mine, and that they don’t intentionally do anything bad.
The second one is trusting that someone’s actions are going to be lined up with their intentions, and that they will take the initiative to ensure this.
The second is much harder to earn, but can be earned without needing to necessarily have my goals.
From the outside, it’s not clear that we can do any better than saying that someone’s intentions are nearly always lined up with their actions. Or, to do better than that, we have to side with a part of them as their “true self”. But the idea that someone else’s goals are aligned with yours is nearly always going to be false except for some very limited set of goals.
I kind of thought it went without saying that atucker was talking about a limited set of goals being aligned?
As a shorthand I have always tended to look at trust on two levels, which seem similar to atucker’s but perhaps not the same? That is: I trust your intentions (in the relevant area), and I trust your competence (in that area). There’s also the issue of diligence, which is a kind of competence and also a kind of intention, so that can complicate things perhaps, but for simplicity I just look at it as two levels.
Well, that was what I meant at least. That it was a limited set of alignment.
Also, I’m pretty sure that most naive morality assumes that people have a true self that is being dealt with. Revealed preferences are a pretty new idea, if I understand correctly, and people tend to get annoyed and defensive when it’s brought up.