Even assuming a plausible scenario in which the US couldn’t defeat Germany, that doesn’t have anything to do with whether we could have defeated Japan standing alone.
Historically, we know it wasn’t that hard for the US—despite Japan attacking first, the US adopted a “Europe First” strategy that committed approx. 2⁄3 of capacity to fighting Germany. Despite this, the US defeated Japan easily—there are no major victories for Japan against the US after Pearl Harbor, and Midway was less than a year after Pearl Harbor. If the US strategy is “Japan First” (doing things like transferring the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific), why should we expect the Pacific war would last long enough that Germany would be able to consolidate a victory in the east into driving the UK into peace and be able to intervene in the Pacific?
Also, why do you think an invasion of Hawaii was possible? The surprise strike was at the end of Japanese logistical capacity—I think the US wins if Japan tries a land invasion.
If the US strategy is “Japan First” (doing things like transferring the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific), why should we expect the Pacific war would last long enough that Germany would be able to consolidate a victory in the east into driving the UK into peace and be able to intervene in the Pacific?
Remember the context: we are in the hypothetical where all US ships (Atlantic fleet included) were magically anihilated in the end of 1941.
I’m a big believer in not fighting the hypothetical, but there is no historically plausible account leading to the destruction of the Atlantic fleet. At that point, we aren’t discussing facts relevant to whether FDR knew of the Pearl Harbor attack ahead of time.
The hypothetical of Pearl Harbor as the most resounding success it could possibly be (US Pacific fleet reduced to irrelevance) and Germany winning the Battle of Moscow strongly enough that it has leverage to force the UK out of the war is reasonable for discussing FDR’s decision process. That’s all he could reasonably have thought he was risking by allowing Pearl Harbor. As I stated elsewhere, I think FDR gets his political goals with Japan firing the first shot—there’s no need for him to court a military disaster.
At that point, we aren’t discussing facts relevant to whether FDR knew of the Pearl Harbor attack ahead of time.
True, but I have joined this part of discussion reacting to this Vladimir_M’s comment:
If anything, the U.S. would have been in a similar position, i.e. at war with Japan with guaranteed victory, even if every single ship under the U.S. flag magically got sunk on December 7, 1941.
Even assuming a plausible scenario in which the US couldn’t defeat Germany, that doesn’t have anything to do with whether we could have defeated Japan standing alone.
Historically, we know it wasn’t that hard for the US—despite Japan attacking first, the US adopted a “Europe First” strategy that committed approx. 2⁄3 of capacity to fighting Germany. Despite this, the US defeated Japan easily—there are no major victories for Japan against the US after Pearl Harbor, and Midway was less than a year after Pearl Harbor. If the US strategy is “Japan First” (doing things like transferring the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific), why should we expect the Pacific war would last long enough that Germany would be able to consolidate a victory in the east into driving the UK into peace and be able to intervene in the Pacific?
Also, why do you think an invasion of Hawaii was possible? The surprise strike was at the end of Japanese logistical capacity—I think the US wins if Japan tries a land invasion.
Remember the context: we are in the hypothetical where all US ships (Atlantic fleet included) were magically anihilated in the end of 1941.
I’m a big believer in not fighting the hypothetical, but there is no historically plausible account leading to the destruction of the Atlantic fleet. At that point, we aren’t discussing facts relevant to whether FDR knew of the Pearl Harbor attack ahead of time.
The hypothetical of Pearl Harbor as the most resounding success it could possibly be (US Pacific fleet reduced to irrelevance) and Germany winning the Battle of Moscow strongly enough that it has leverage to force the UK out of the war is reasonable for discussing FDR’s decision process. That’s all he could reasonably have thought he was risking by allowing Pearl Harbor. As I stated elsewhere, I think FDR gets his political goals with Japan firing the first shot—there’s no need for him to court a military disaster.
True, but I have joined this part of discussion reacting to this Vladimir_M’s comment: