If believing P doesn’t affect anything, then naturally believing non-P doesn’t affect anything either. So, if you agree that “1 and 0 aren’t probabilities” is an inconsequential belief, does it mean that your answer to my original question is “yes”?
Saying that my belief in P is inconsequential implies that actually I am acting as if I believed not-P, even though I profess a belief in P. I argue that, conversely, many people who profess a belief in not-P act as if they actually believe P.
The point is that “acting as if one believes P” and “acting as if one believes not-P” can sometimes be the same actings. This is what I meant by “inconsequential”. I want to know whether, in your opinion, this is such a situation; that is, whether there is some imaginable behaviour (other than professing the belief) which would make sense if one believed that “1 is not a probability” but would not make sense if one believed otherwise.
Saying that my belief in P is inconsequential implies that actually I am acting as if I believed not-P, even though I profess a belief in P. I argue that, conversely, many people who profess a belief in not-P act as if they actually believe P.
The point is that “acting as if one believes P” and “acting as if one believes not-P” can sometimes be the same actings. This is what I meant by “inconsequential”. I want to know whether, in your opinion, this is such a situation; that is, whether there is some imaginable behaviour (other than professing the belief) which would make sense if one believed that “1 is not a probability” but would not make sense if one believed otherwise.