“Philosophers debating free will have long understood that the term can be used in many ways, most of which are incoherent. Thus, advocates of “libertarian free will” (founded on the belief that free will requires indeterminism) have had to face the objection that indeterminate events in the brain would be expected to produce randomness, not freedom. And advocates of “compatibilist free will” (founded on the belief that some kinds of free will are compatible with determinism) have had to face other problems, including the one that many people find compatibilism intuitively implausible. Despite these difficulties, most leading philosophers (with a few important exceptions such as Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom and Ted Honderich), have come to the conclusion that, if used cautiously, the term “free will” can be applied to human beings in a coherent, meaningful and true manner. One of the hard-won achievements of this 200 year old debate has been to separate out conceptions of free will that have a good chance of being coherent and even true, from those that are incoherent or probably untrue. It has been clear to all for many years that unsophisticated conceptions of free will are unlikely to stand up to philosophical analysis.
This 66 page text makes little attempt to contribute to the modern debate, but rather takes the easy option of attacking “the popular conception of free will” which, according to Harris “seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present”. Of course, this popular conception gets a thrashing, because assumption (1) is ambiguous and assumption (2) is simplistic (interpreted to mean that we choose what to think before we think it).
Whether this conception is really popular is debatable. There has been research on what ordinary people believe about free will, and popular beliefs actually seem to be rather varied, but let us suppose that at least some people have a conception of free will resembling the one Harris attacks. For such people, the book may be useful. It is certainly much easier to read than the works of professional philosophers.
Harris has not refuted free will, but has mounted a ferocious attack on one rather naïve version of it. He doesn’t seriously grapple with modern scholarship. Admittedly, he does briefly discuss two short texts from compatibilist philosophers Tom Clark and Eddy Nahmias. He merely dismisses libertarianism in a single sentence as not being “respectable” (page 16). He wins a cheap victory. Why should anybody be surprised if an unsophisticated “popular” view of free will can be knocked down?
”—Amazon review.
Whether this conception is really popular is debatable.
Harris attacks a fairly strong current in modern society, of treating people who have broken rules or the law with hatred and anger. When a person wrongs another, people react with anger and hatred, rather than stopping and thinking about what they could best do to help a situation where person who has acted wrongly (or at least, this has happened in every directly social confrontation I have witnessed). This is what Harris is combatting, not what modern philosophers are currently discussing (which often doesn’t reach outside of their seemingly ivory towers).
Harris is a mainly political speaker, not philosophical, and he works at changing the status quo. He isn’t trying to disprove the common beliefs, and take credit for it by publishing it in a philosophy journal. He’s writing accessibly to all, because all over the world people aren’t getting the basic ideas, which can really make a difference (he certainly opened my mind).
Harris attacks a fairly strong current in modern society, of treating people who have broken rules or the law with hatred and anger.
Modern US society? Modern Danish society?
This is what Harris is combatting, not what modern philosophers are currently discussing
Harris mentions Libet’s research. I can’t see how that is socio-politcal. It is surely concerned with whether our brains can actually “do” volition.
He’s writing accessibly to all, because all over the world people aren’t getting the basic ideas,
What basic ideas? That FW is defintiely an illusion? But Harris’s critics from within the academy take issue with that. They say they (whether scientists or philosophers) have made not such definitive discovery, and that Harris is cherry-picking and otherwise misrepresenting their results.
I found that last article very interesting. I do feel as though people argue over definitions (which he has a chapter on, arguing for his definition). But, I see he has not combatted a great deal of the modern debate over that-which-is-called ‘Free Will’.
I think he has made a very strong case against the idea of punishment for punishment’s sake (against those that do ‘wrong’) that I don’t see any future conception of ‘Free Will’ resurrecting. This is what I have taken from the book, which I think is what it does brilliantly, but I do see he unhelpfully conflates definitions. The main thing that everyone I know who has read the book has taken, is the idea that people aren’t the sole causes of their evil acts, and we can still act morally following this truth. That’s the ‘Free Will’ that has been demolished in my mind, which is why I defend his book. It feels now as though he’s not straw-manned the argument, as much as called it the wrong thing, so I’ll go revise my definitions. I do like the book a lot, though. :)
I think he has made a very strong case against the idea of punishment for punishment’s sake
I don’t see how that has very much to do with FW at all. There are harsher and more liberla justice systems, and the differnce is that the harsher ones have agendas that are driven by the popular media, whereas the liberal ones are driven by evidence and expert opinion.
No, Sam Harris has not disproved free will.
“Philosophers debating free will have long understood that the term can be used in many ways, most of which are incoherent. Thus, advocates of “libertarian free will” (founded on the belief that free will requires indeterminism) have had to face the objection that indeterminate events in the brain would be expected to produce randomness, not freedom. And advocates of “compatibilist free will” (founded on the belief that some kinds of free will are compatible with determinism) have had to face other problems, including the one that many people find compatibilism intuitively implausible. Despite these difficulties, most leading philosophers (with a few important exceptions such as Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom and Ted Honderich), have come to the conclusion that, if used cautiously, the term “free will” can be applied to human beings in a coherent, meaningful and true manner. One of the hard-won achievements of this 200 year old debate has been to separate out conceptions of free will that have a good chance of being coherent and even true, from those that are incoherent or probably untrue. It has been clear to all for many years that unsophisticated conceptions of free will are unlikely to stand up to philosophical analysis.
This 66 page text makes little attempt to contribute to the modern debate, but rather takes the easy option of attacking “the popular conception of free will” which, according to Harris “seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present”. Of course, this popular conception gets a thrashing, because assumption (1) is ambiguous and assumption (2) is simplistic (interpreted to mean that we choose what to think before we think it).
Whether this conception is really popular is debatable. There has been research on what ordinary people believe about free will, and popular beliefs actually seem to be rather varied, but let us suppose that at least some people have a conception of free will resembling the one Harris attacks. For such people, the book may be useful. It is certainly much easier to read than the works of professional philosophers.
Harris has not refuted free will, but has mounted a ferocious attack on one rather naïve version of it. He doesn’t seriously grapple with modern scholarship. Admittedly, he does briefly discuss two short texts from compatibilist philosophers Tom Clark and Eddy Nahmias. He merely dismisses libertarianism in a single sentence as not being “respectable” (page 16). He wins a cheap victory. Why should anybody be surprised if an unsophisticated “popular” view of free will can be knocked down? ”—Amazon review.
Harris attacks a fairly strong current in modern society, of treating people who have broken rules or the law with hatred and anger. When a person wrongs another, people react with anger and hatred, rather than stopping and thinking about what they could best do to help a situation where person who has acted wrongly (or at least, this has happened in every directly social confrontation I have witnessed). This is what Harris is combatting, not what modern philosophers are currently discussing (which often doesn’t reach outside of their seemingly ivory towers). Harris is a mainly political speaker, not philosophical, and he works at changing the status quo. He isn’t trying to disprove the common beliefs, and take credit for it by publishing it in a philosophy journal. He’s writing accessibly to all, because all over the world people aren’t getting the basic ideas, which can really make a difference (he certainly opened my mind).
Modern US society? Modern Danish society?
Harris mentions Libet’s research. I can’t see how that is socio-politcal. It is surely concerned with whether our brains can actually “do” volition.
What basic ideas? That FW is defintiely an illusion? But Harris’s critics from within the academy take issue with that. They say they (whether scientists or philosophers) have made not such definitive discovery, and that Harris is cherry-picking and otherwise misrepresenting their results.
Yes, I made too many generalisations in my reply.
I found that last article very interesting. I do feel as though people argue over definitions (which he has a chapter on, arguing for his definition). But, I see he has not combatted a great deal of the modern debate over that-which-is-called ‘Free Will’.
I think he has made a very strong case against the idea of punishment for punishment’s sake (against those that do ‘wrong’) that I don’t see any future conception of ‘Free Will’ resurrecting. This is what I have taken from the book, which I think is what it does brilliantly, but I do see he unhelpfully conflates definitions. The main thing that everyone I know who has read the book has taken, is the idea that people aren’t the sole causes of their evil acts, and we can still act morally following this truth. That’s the ‘Free Will’ that has been demolished in my mind, which is why I defend his book. It feels now as though he’s not straw-manned the argument, as much as called it the wrong thing, so I’ll go revise my definitions. I do like the book a lot, though. :)
I don’t see how that has very much to do with FW at all. There are harsher and more liberla justice systems, and the differnce is that the harsher ones have agendas that are driven by the popular media, whereas the liberal ones are driven by evidence and expert opinion.