If the definition of “future selves” will not be used to determine who to care about and how much, then it has no consequences on one’s decisions, so you might as well say that there is no such thing as future selves, that there is only how much we care about various person-moments, which is essentially arbitrary.
This position seems analogous to position 4 in What Are Probabilities, Anyway?, which says there is no such thing as “reality fluid” or “measure” in an objective sense, that there’s only how much we care about various universes.
But what if there is such a thing as future selves, or reality fluid? It seems to me in that case we probably want to care more about our future selves, and about universes that have more reality fluid. Shouldn’t we keep these questions open until we have better arguments one way or another?
I don’t see what reality fluid or similar ideas have to do with it. If you don’t care about your future selve, I see no reality fluid or measure-based argument that would convince you otherwise.
I just note that “caring about them” is a strong characteristic of our current concept of future selves, and should probably be part of any definition.
It seems to me that I care about my future selves because they are my future selves (whatever that means), not the other way around. If I took a drug that made me care less, I would still have future selves.
If the definition of “future selves” will not be used to determine who to care about and how much, then it has no consequences on one’s decisions, so you might as well say that there is no such thing as future selves, that there is only how much we care about various person-moments, which is essentially arbitrary.
This position seems analogous to position 4 in What Are Probabilities, Anyway?, which says there is no such thing as “reality fluid” or “measure” in an objective sense, that there’s only how much we care about various universes.
But what if there is such a thing as future selves, or reality fluid? It seems to me in that case we probably want to care more about our future selves, and about universes that have more reality fluid. Shouldn’t we keep these questions open until we have better arguments one way or another?
I don’t see what reality fluid or similar ideas have to do with it. If you don’t care about your future selve, I see no reality fluid or measure-based argument that would convince you otherwise.
I just note that “caring about them” is a strong characteristic of our current concept of future selves, and should probably be part of any definition.
It seems to me that I care about my future selves because they are my future selves (whatever that means), not the other way around. If I took a drug that made me care less, I would still have future selves.