I’m not suggesting that one only reclines if one is given permission to do so from the person behind them. I’m suggesting cooperation on the act that is controlled by one person but effects two people. If reclining is a minor convenience to the person in front, but would crush the legs of the person behind, it does not happen. If the person in front has a back problem and the person in back is short, reclining does happen.
The problem with this is that it creates an incentive for both people to claim that the magnitude of their inconvenience / discomfort / etc. is the greater one. (See Vladimir_M’s comments on this classic post for a thorough discussion and analysis of this phenomenon.)
If you disagree with this, would you agree that if airplanes were naturally occurring rather than being engineered, then the decision of whether to recline should be a conversation between the two people it effects?
No. The same problem arises in this case also.
Or, to get at my emotional crux, if my very long legs would be smooshed if you were to recline, and reclining was a minor convenience for you, would you say “ok, I won’t recline, but let’s be angry at the airline for putting us in this situation”, or “nope I’m reclining anyways, blame the airline”?
The problem with this question is that your scenario description is only coherent from a god’s-eye view of the situation. From my point of view, the scenario is “reclining is a minor convenience for me, and the person behind me claims that it would be a major discomfort for him if I were to recline”. But if my predictable reaction to such a claim is not to recline, then this means that you had a clear incentive (with no apparent downside) to make the claim, which in turn means that I cannot trust your claim. At the very least, it seems very likely that you’d exaggerate your claim, if not outright fabricate it.
(And, of course, all of this is if we take a utilitarian approach to the matter in the first place.)
There are, at most, two Schelling points here, if we assume that the airlines change nothing about their business practices: (a) everyone reclines whenever they feel like it and are able to do so, and (b) nobody reclines ever. But there is no clear way to get to (b) from where we are, and I personally prefer (a) to (b). (Of course, I even more strongly prefer not to have to have the sort of customer experience where I have to deal with such a choice, and this is just one of the many, many reasons why I don’t fly these days.)
The problem with this is that it creates an incentive for both people to claim that the magnitude of their inconvenience / discomfort / etc. is the greater one. (See Vladimir_M’s comments on this classic post for a thorough discussion and analysis of this phenomenon.)
No. The same problem arises in this case also.
The problem with this question is that your scenario description is only coherent from a god’s-eye view of the situation. From my point of view, the scenario is “reclining is a minor convenience for me, and the person behind me claims that it would be a major discomfort for him if I were to recline”. But if my predictable reaction to such a claim is not to recline, then this means that you had a clear incentive (with no apparent downside) to make the claim, which in turn means that I cannot trust your claim. At the very least, it seems very likely that you’d exaggerate your claim, if not outright fabricate it.
(And, of course, all of this is if we take a utilitarian approach to the matter in the first place.)
There are, at most, two Schelling points here, if we assume that the airlines change nothing about their business practices: (a) everyone reclines whenever they feel like it and are able to do so, and (b) nobody reclines ever. But there is no clear way to get to (b) from where we are, and I personally prefer (a) to (b). (Of course, I even more strongly prefer not to have to have the sort of customer experience where I have to deal with such a choice, and this is just one of the many, many reasons why I don’t fly these days.)