I suspect the problem is unsolvable, as long as there is private information about preferences and beliefs. Even the relatively strong weighting mechanisms of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futarchy ( conditional prediction betting, where correct predictions get promoted because they pay out ) are very susceptible to adversarial choice of proposals to vote on.
Some systems can be strategy-proofed to elicit true beliefs on a few chosen topics, but whoever chooses the topics is going to have oversized influence in how it plays out. Quadratic systems (and any directed-vote mechanism) can be EASILY gamed by aggregating decisions into a bunch of small, independent issues that one group prefers, and a few large bundles that another prefers. In wargaming, we’d call this “soaking off” the damage—letting the opposition waste their votes on less-important things.
I suspect the problem is unsolvable, as long as there is private information about preferences and beliefs. Even the relatively strong weighting mechanisms of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futarchy ( conditional prediction betting, where correct predictions get promoted because they pay out ) are very susceptible to adversarial choice of proposals to vote on.
Some systems can be strategy-proofed to elicit true beliefs on a few chosen topics, but whoever chooses the topics is going to have oversized influence in how it plays out. Quadratic systems (and any directed-vote mechanism) can be EASILY gamed by aggregating decisions into a bunch of small, independent issues that one group prefers, and a few large bundles that another prefers. In wargaming, we’d call this “soaking off” the damage—letting the opposition waste their votes on less-important things.