My main objection to this view is, broadly speaking, that there is no canonical “idealised version” of a person
Then the project of ethics becomes about this subproblem of identifying a close enough idealization/tempering of a person. Value aggregation seems solvable with this component and not at all solvable without it.
Are my values taken from the state of mind in which I’m most agentic, the state of mind when my awareness is as expansive as it gets, the things I would decide after a hundred years reflection, the person I wish I was in spite of the one that I am, or have I internalized the values of my community to such a deep extent that a portion of the decision as to who I will crystalize as lies with them? Where from our daily stream of desires do we sample, beginning middle or end? Should the (simulated) moral judgement interview room be brown or white or green? Should we be judging in prospective or retrospective? Alone, or with friends?
I think this may be the component of the specification of alignment or a single human’s desires, that may actually be culturally specific, this may be the part of the job that humanities majors are supposed to do, if their art is real?
What’s the logical and theoretical basis for the supposed existence of such a construct?
If there isn’t, then the default assumption is that there’s no such thing. Much like how we by default assume that there are no porcelain teapots orbiting the sun.
I feel like you’re asking me the logical and theoretical basis for the existence of feet: I don’t know what must be going on in your head to ask such a question, why you would have a blindspot for such an obvious thing, so I don’t know how to help.
You have not sensed that humans are often like agents, or agency-pursuing, or that they have consistent enough desires, or that they aren’t attached to their inconsistencies, or that the inconsistencies they’re most attached to could be formalized as a kind of discontinuity in a utility function. To have passions that are taken seriously. I don’t know what it means for a person to lack that sense.
You think the average person has, or believes in, a ‘canonical “idealised version”’ of themselves in some form?
Did you forget that your quoting Richard_Ngo who also has expressed reservations along the same lines?
I don’t want to burst your bubble but the chances of your views being in the minority is not zero. Certainly far greater then what the certitude of the reply would suggest.
Then the project of ethics becomes about this subproblem of identifying a close enough idealization/tempering of a person.
Value aggregation seems solvable with this component and not at all solvable without it.
Are my values taken from the state of mind in which I’m most agentic, the state of mind when my awareness is as expansive as it gets, the things I would decide after a hundred years reflection, the person I wish I was in spite of the one that I am, or have I internalized the values of my community to such a deep extent that a portion of the decision as to who I will crystalize as lies with them? Where from our daily stream of desires do we sample, beginning middle or end? Should the (simulated) moral judgement interview room be brown or white or green? Should we be judging in prospective or retrospective? Alone, or with friends?
I think this may be the component of the specification of alignment or a single human’s desires, that may actually be culturally specific, this may be the part of the job that humanities majors are supposed to do, if their art is real?
What’s the logical and theoretical basis for the supposed existence of such a construct?
If there isn’t, then the default assumption is that there’s no such thing. Much like how we by default assume that there are no porcelain teapots orbiting the sun.
I feel like you’re asking me the logical and theoretical basis for the existence of feet: I don’t know what must be going on in your head to ask such a question, why you would have a blindspot for such an obvious thing, so I don’t know how to help.
You have not sensed that humans are often like agents, or agency-pursuing, or that they have consistent enough desires, or that they aren’t attached to their inconsistencies, or that the inconsistencies they’re most attached to could be formalized as a kind of discontinuity in a utility function. To have passions that are taken seriously. I don’t know what it means for a person to lack that sense.
You think the average person has, or believes in, a ‘canonical “idealised version”’ of themselves in some form?
Did you forget that your quoting Richard_Ngo who also has expressed reservations along the same lines?
I don’t want to burst your bubble but the chances of your views being in the minority is not zero. Certainly far greater then what the certitude of the reply would suggest.
Has, doesn’t believe in, but would after the right series of conversations.
Quoting? I see the reservations. I’m trying to engage with them.