Robin, I would say that the data on a particular supernova is “scientific evidence” because, as used, it’s evidence you can use to form scientific generalizations about supernovae. The process of science does require doing particular experiments. But that such-and-such supernova was observed by such-and-such telescope to do this-and-whatnot is a historical truth, not a scientific truth—you can’t verify it for yourself.
Indeed, the notion that “scientific evidence” is a deliberate social choice seems dangerous, and that’s why it’s important to pair it with the dictum that Bayesian evidence is objective and that all scientific evidence must be Bayesian evidence, i.e., it’s not all up for grabs.
But, having said this, it seems to me that the cry “That isn’t science!” has hurt more than it’s helped, historically speaking, precisely because people do think there’s an objective standard of science “out there” which their opponents are wilfully disobeying, as if science were Bayesian probability theory. So I think that it will indeed help to reframe the debate around the idea of “scientific standards” as an artificial social construct, used to achieve social ends, but still subject to the overriding mathematical constraints of Bayesian rationality.
It is better to have an explicit debate about social utility then to have a definition-fight framed as beliefs about what science really is. I am making a social-utility argument for openness as part of the rightful definition of science. I must expose this argument openly and let people criticize it, without charging them $30.
Robin, I would say that the data on a particular supernova is “scientific evidence” because, as used, it’s evidence you can use to form scientific generalizations about supernovae. The process of science does require doing particular experiments. But that such-and-such supernova was observed by such-and-such telescope to do this-and-whatnot is a historical truth, not a scientific truth—you can’t verify it for yourself.
Indeed, the notion that “scientific evidence” is a deliberate social choice seems dangerous, and that’s why it’s important to pair it with the dictum that Bayesian evidence is objective and that all scientific evidence must be Bayesian evidence, i.e., it’s not all up for grabs.
But, having said this, it seems to me that the cry “That isn’t science!” has hurt more than it’s helped, historically speaking, precisely because people do think there’s an objective standard of science “out there” which their opponents are wilfully disobeying, as if science were Bayesian probability theory. So I think that it will indeed help to reframe the debate around the idea of “scientific standards” as an artificial social construct, used to achieve social ends, but still subject to the overriding mathematical constraints of Bayesian rationality.
It is better to have an explicit debate about social utility then to have a definition-fight framed as beliefs about what science really is. I am making a social-utility argument for openness as part of the rightful definition of science. I must expose this argument openly and let people criticize it, without charging them $30.