Indeed. But I can’t actually figure out which way it’s partial :-)
if you did both methods perfectly, they’d agree
Yes… and no. What’s happening in your example is that the phrasings are triggering different ethical values. So while they would agree as descriptions of reality, people’s (malleable) values would be triggered in different ways by the two descriptions. But why do I bring up this somewhat unrealated point?
So too for ethics.
Because in ethics, we are choosing our values (among incompatible or at least in-tension values) so there’s no reason to suspect that the two approaches would reach the same outcome.
Indeed. But I can’t actually figure out which way it’s partial :-)
I’m happy to hear that—I think :)
Yes… and no. What’s happening in your example is that the phrasings are triggering different ethical values.
I don’t think that’s the entire story—I think there are facts that are more apparent to some views than to others. A perfect bottom-up reasoner would be able to consider an individual and conclude (if it were true) that paying police to fine them for not wearing seat belts really would make them wear seat belts more with net positive effect. A perfect top-down reasoner would see the aggregate effects of seat belt laws (if there were any) on autonomy, annoyance, and any other things that we don’t have numbers on in real life. That is, either view will trigger all of the relevant values if it’s done well enough.
In the ethics case, I’m similarly hopeful that there is a coherent answer—that is, that if the repugnant conclusion really is wrong, a perfect differential reasoner would immediately spot the flawed step without having to consider the integral effect, and if the repugnant conclusion is correct, a perfect integral reasoner would see that without having to construct a series of mere addition steps.
Why do I think there’s a coherent answer? Maybe just optimism… but the post was suggesting that we should use integral ethics more. The ‘should’ in the previous sentence suggests that the choice between the obvious differential answer and the obvious integral answer is at least not arbitrary. Also, maybe I’m taking the mathematical terminology too literally, but to a logically perfect reasoner the differential and integral forms should imply each other.
Indeed. But I can’t actually figure out which way it’s partial :-)
Yes… and no. What’s happening in your example is that the phrasings are triggering different ethical values. So while they would agree as descriptions of reality, people’s (malleable) values would be triggered in different ways by the two descriptions. But why do I bring up this somewhat unrealated point?
Because in ethics, we are choosing our values (among incompatible or at least in-tension values) so there’s no reason to suspect that the two approaches would reach the same outcome.
In the ethics case, I’m similarly hopeful that there is a coherent answer—that is, that if the repugnant conclusion really is wrong, a perfect differential reasoner would immediately spot the flawed step without having to consider the integral effect, and if the repugnant conclusion is correct, a perfect integral reasoner would see that without having to construct a series of mere addition steps.
Why do I think there’s a coherent answer? Maybe just optimism… but the post was suggesting that we should use integral ethics more. The ‘should’ in the previous sentence suggests that the choice between the obvious differential answer and the obvious integral answer is at least not arbitrary. Also, maybe I’m taking the mathematical terminology too literally, but to a logically perfect reasoner the differential and integral forms should imply each other.