It seems to me that Chalmers does not just believe in epiphenomenal consciousness. Chalmers posits a non-physical concept of “direct access” and a non-physical notion of “having an experience.” I can’t see how one can give an account of “direct access” and “having an experience” as dual properties. But if “direct access” and “having an experience” are given physical accounts then the whole argument for epiphenomenalism falls apart; a physical system cannot gain “direct access” because physical systems are always mediated (and it’s this “direct access” that premises his entire argument; if he could be wrong about being conscious the argument would not go through) and “having an experience” couldn’t be a counterpart to having a causal link between your experience and your beliefs (as Chalmers uses it) if it was identical with such a causal link.
It seems to me that Chalmers does not just believe in epiphenomenal consciousness. Chalmers posits a non-physical concept of “direct access” and a non-physical notion of “having an experience.” I can’t see how one can give an account of “direct access” and “having an experience” as dual properties. But if “direct access” and “having an experience” are given physical accounts then the whole argument for epiphenomenalism falls apart; a physical system cannot gain “direct access” because physical systems are always mediated (and it’s this “direct access” that premises his entire argument; if he could be wrong about being conscious the argument would not go through) and “having an experience” couldn’t be a counterpart to having a causal link between your experience and your beliefs (as Chalmers uses it) if it was identical with such a causal link.