We have that “special” feeling: we are distinct beings from all the others, including zombie twins. I think we tend to use only one word for two different concepts, which causes a lot of confusion… Namely:
1) the ability of intelligent physical systems to reflect on themselves, imagine what we think or whatever makes us think that whichever we are talking to is “conscious”
2) that special feeling that somebody is listening in there. AGI research tries to solve the first problem, Chalmers the second one.
So let’s try to create zombies then! I don’t see why this seems logically so difficult, we only need some nanotechnology… So consider the following thought experiment.
You enter room A. Some equipment scans your atoms, and after scanning each, replaces it with one of the same element, same position. Meanwhile, the original atoms are assembled in room B, resulting in a zombie twin of you. You were conscious all along, and noticed nothing except some buzz coming from the walls… So you wouldn’t be worried about the experiment even if your zombie is killed afterward, or sent to the stone mines of Mars for a lifelong sentence, etc.
You enter room A. Now, the copy process goes cell by cell. Scanning every cell, making an atom-by-atom perfect copy of it, then replacing, original goes into room B, assembled. You still notice nothing.
You enter room A. Your whole brain is grabbed, scanned, and then placed into room B. The body with the copied brain and other organs walks out happily of room A, while you go to the stone mines. A bit more depressing than the original version.
So, if we copy only atoms or cells (which is regularly done in our bodies), we stay in room A. If we copy whole organs or bodies, we go to room B. It wouldn’t be intuitive to postulate that consciousness can be divided, it’s either in room A or room B. But the quantity of atoms to be moved in one step is almost continous… it would be weird to assume that there is some magic number of them which allows consciousness to transfer.
The conclusion: to differentiate between “conscious beings” and “zombies” leads to contradiction even from a subjective viewpoint. (Where would that mysterious “inner Chalmers” be in the above cases?)
I think we are used to our consistent self-image too much, and can’t imagine how anything else would feel. An example: using brain-computer interfaces, we construct a camera which watches our surroundings, even as we sleep. As we wake up, we could “remember” what happened while we slept, because of the connection the camera hardware made with our memories. (The right images just “popped into our minds”.) But how would it feel? Were we conscious at night? If not, why do we remember certain things? If we were, why did we just watch as those thieves got away with all our stuff?
All we need to understand that is some experience. If it were given, we wouldn’t ask questions like “why am I so special”, I think.
We have that “special” feeling: we are distinct beings from all the others, including zombie twins. I think we tend to use only one word for two different concepts, which causes a lot of confusion… Namely: 1) the ability of intelligent physical systems to reflect on themselves, imagine what we think or whatever makes us think that whichever we are talking to is “conscious” 2) that special feeling that somebody is listening in there. AGI research tries to solve the first problem, Chalmers the second one.
So let’s try to create zombies then! I don’t see why this seems logically so difficult, we only need some nanotechnology… So consider the following thought experiment.
You enter room A. Some equipment scans your atoms, and after scanning each, replaces it with one of the same element, same position. Meanwhile, the original atoms are assembled in room B, resulting in a zombie twin of you. You were conscious all along, and noticed nothing except some buzz coming from the walls… So you wouldn’t be worried about the experiment even if your zombie is killed afterward, or sent to the stone mines of Mars for a lifelong sentence, etc.
You enter room A. Now, the copy process goes cell by cell. Scanning every cell, making an atom-by-atom perfect copy of it, then replacing, original goes into room B, assembled. You still notice nothing.
You enter room A. Your whole brain is grabbed, scanned, and then placed into room B. The body with the copied brain and other organs walks out happily of room A, while you go to the stone mines. A bit more depressing than the original version.
So, if we copy only atoms or cells (which is regularly done in our bodies), we stay in room A. If we copy whole organs or bodies, we go to room B. It wouldn’t be intuitive to postulate that consciousness can be divided, it’s either in room A or room B. But the quantity of atoms to be moved in one step is almost continous… it would be weird to assume that there is some magic number of them which allows consciousness to transfer.
The conclusion: to differentiate between “conscious beings” and “zombies” leads to contradiction even from a subjective viewpoint. (Where would that mysterious “inner Chalmers” be in the above cases?)
I think we are used to our consistent self-image too much, and can’t imagine how anything else would feel. An example: using brain-computer interfaces, we construct a camera which watches our surroundings, even as we sleep. As we wake up, we could “remember” what happened while we slept, because of the connection the camera hardware made with our memories. (The right images just “popped into our minds”.) But how would it feel? Were we conscious at night? If not, why do we remember certain things? If we were, why did we just watch as those thieves got away with all our stuff?
All we need to understand that is some experience. If it were given, we wouldn’t ask questions like “why am I so special”, I think.
Why do you assume that the replica would be a zombie?