Late note, and apologies if this is obvious: could Chalmers’ missing piece be that his epiphenomenal-Chalmers is actually the model Chalmers has of himself? Ie. not that dual-Chalmers causes a physical effect, or that they’re causally distinct, but that the physics of physical-Chalmers’ cognition cause the epiphenomenal-Chalmers-model to be created in Chalmers’ physical head? And that that’s the reason physical-Chalmers talks about consciousness? (Which would make zombieChalmers correct, of course) And that it looks like there’d be an epiChalmers because Chalmers doesn’t correctly identify modelChalmers as a product of physicalChalmers’ cognitive algorithm?
In other words, he’d need to read How an Algorithm Feels on the Inside.
Late note, and apologies if this is obvious: could Chalmers’ missing piece be that his epiphenomenal-Chalmers is actually the model Chalmers has of himself? Ie. not that dual-Chalmers causes a physical effect, or that they’re causally distinct, but that the physics of physical-Chalmers’ cognition cause the epiphenomenal-Chalmers-model to be created in Chalmers’ physical head? And that that’s the reason physical-Chalmers talks about consciousness? (Which would make zombieChalmers correct, of course) And that it looks like there’d be an epiChalmers because Chalmers doesn’t correctly identify modelChalmers as a product of physicalChalmers’ cognitive algorithm?
In other words, he’d need to read How an Algorithm Feels on the Inside.