Upvoted for pointing out that the post fails to address a basic issue.
However, I don’t think anything said in the post is really wrong. Your characterization of the zombie argument appears to be this:
A1: Science can say nothing about the nature of subjective experience.
A2: If science can say nothing about the nature of subjective experience, then science must leave open the possibility of zombies.
Conclusion: Science leaves open the possibility of zombies.
The “long version” of the zombie argument has much to say in order to establish A1 and A2. However, the essence of A1 was (in my understanding) established as a philosophical idea long before the zombie argument. If I understand your complaint, it is that Eliezer is not really addressing A2 at all, which is the meat of the zombie argument; rather, in rejecting the conclusion, he is rejecting A1. So, for a more complete argument, he could have directly addressed the idea of the “hard problem of consciousness” and its relationship to empirical science. (Perhaps he does this in other posts; I haven’t read ’em all...)
EDIT:
I now have a different understanding (thanks to talking to Richard elsewhere). The point of the zombie argument, in this understanding, is to distinguish “the hard problem of consciousness” from other problems (especially, the neurological problem). Eliezer argues by identifying belief in Zombies with epiphenomenalism; but this seems to require the wrong form of “possible”.
If the zombie argument is meant to establish that given an explanation for the neurological problem, we would still need an explanation for the hard problem, then the notion of “possible” that is relevant is “possible given a theory explaining neurological consciousness”. The zombie argument relies on our intuitions to conclude that, given such a theory, we could still not rule out philosophical zombies.
This does not imply epiphenomenalism because it does not imply that zombies are causally possible. It only argues the need for more statements to rule them out.
That said—if Eliezer is simply denying the intuition that the zombie argument relies on (the intuition that there is something about consciousness that would be left unexplained after we had a physical theory of consciousness, so that such a theory leaves open the possibility of zombies), then that’s “fair game”.
So, for a more complete argument, he could have directly addressed the idea of the “hard problem of consciousness” and its relationship to empirical science.
He could have, but, logically speaking, he doesn’t need to. If he rejects the premise A1, he can then reject the conclusion as well, even if the reason A2 is logically valid—since rejecting A1 renders the conclusion unsound.
Upvoted for pointing out that the post fails to address a basic issue.
However, I don’t think anything said in the post is really wrong. Your characterization of the zombie argument appears to be this:
The “long version” of the zombie argument has much to say in order to establish A1 and A2. However, the essence of A1 was (in my understanding) established as a philosophical idea long before the zombie argument. If I understand your complaint, it is that Eliezer is not really addressing A2 at all, which is the meat of the zombie argument; rather, in rejecting the conclusion, he is rejecting A1. So, for a more complete argument, he could have directly addressed the idea of the “hard problem of consciousness” and its relationship to empirical science. (Perhaps he does this in other posts; I haven’t read ’em all...)
EDIT:
I now have a different understanding (thanks to talking to Richard elsewhere). The point of the zombie argument, in this understanding, is to distinguish “the hard problem of consciousness” from other problems (especially, the neurological problem). Eliezer argues by identifying belief in Zombies with epiphenomenalism; but this seems to require the wrong form of “possible”.
If the zombie argument is meant to establish that given an explanation for the neurological problem, we would still need an explanation for the hard problem, then the notion of “possible” that is relevant is “possible given a theory explaining neurological consciousness”. The zombie argument relies on our intuitions to conclude that, given such a theory, we could still not rule out philosophical zombies.
This does not imply epiphenomenalism because it does not imply that zombies are causally possible. It only argues the need for more statements to rule them out.
That said—if Eliezer is simply denying the intuition that the zombie argument relies on (the intuition that there is something about consciousness that would be left unexplained after we had a physical theory of consciousness, so that such a theory leaves open the possibility of zombies), then that’s “fair game”.
He could have, but, logically speaking, he doesn’t need to. If he rejects the premise A1, he can then reject the conclusion as well, even if the reason A2 is logically valid—since rejecting A1 renders the conclusion unsound.