This distinction of which demands are or aren’t decision-theoretic threats that rational agents shouldn’t give in to is a major theme of the last ~quarter of Planecrash (enormous spoilers in the spoiler text).
Keltham demands to the gods “Reduce the amount of suffering in Creation or I will destroy it”. But this is not a decision-theoretic threat, because Keltham honestly prefers destroying creation to the status quo. If the gods don’t give into his demand, carrying through with his promise is in his own interest.
If Nethys had made the same demand, it would have been a decision-theoretic threat. Nethys prefers the status quo to Creation being destroyed, so he would have no reason to make the demand other than the hope that the other gods would give in.
This theme is brought up many times, but there’s not one comprehensive explanation to link to. (The parable of the little bird is the closest I can think of.)
This distinction of which demands are or aren’t decision-theoretic threats that rational agents shouldn’t give in to is a major theme of the last ~quarter of Planecrash (enormous spoilers in the spoiler text).
Keltham demands to the gods “Reduce the amount of suffering in Creation or I will destroy it”. But this is not a decision-theoretic threat, because Keltham honestly prefers destroying creation to the status quo. If the gods don’t give into his demand, carrying through with his promise is in his own interest.
If Nethys had made the same demand, it would have been a decision-theoretic threat. Nethys prefers the status quo to Creation being destroyed, so he would have no reason to make the demand other than the hope that the other gods would give in.
This theme is brought up many times, but there’s not one comprehensive explanation to link to. (The parable of the little bird is the closest I can think of.)