First, for the world outside of LW that’s a meaningless distinction.
Second, I’m not sure how do you know what the actual differences are. Doesn’t it boil down to the “Bayesian racists” being able to cite some science to support what they believe and the “non-Bayesian racists” not being able to?
Third, you still need to jump the gap between believing the races to be different and wanting to “decrease utility” of other people.
Third, you still need to jump the gap between believing the races to be different and wanting to “decrease utility” of other people.
There is no gap. If you have reason to believe the races to be different, and act differently towards them based solely on this difference, you’re a Bayseian racist, and I do not claim that Bayseian racists want to decrease utility of other people. Non-Bayseian racists do; a non-Bayseian racist is different from a Bayseian racist.
If you have reason to believe the races to be different, and act differently towards them based solely on this difference, you’re a Bayseian racist
So, let’s take some Southern redneck. He interacts with black people on a regular basis and based on his personal experience he came to the conclusion that they are pretty damn dumb, dumber than white rednecks, anyway. Does he have a “reason to believe”? Is he a Bayesian racist?
Or let’s take Alice. Alice knows the statistics about crime rates among black males and, say, Asian males. So on an empty street when she sees a black male she actively avoids him, but when she sees an Asian male she does not. Is she a Bayesian racist?
If there are no cognitive biases involved, sure. In practice, I think that would be unlikely.
On the other hand, someone who says “I find the presence of black people to be disgusting. I would not hire one because I don’t want to be near them” would be a non-Bayseian racist. There’s no Bayseian reason for, for instance, having segregated water fountains.
You’re using the word “Bayesian” here as a synonym for “rational”, right?
Well, Bayseian is a synonym for being rational (or for a subset of being rational), so it amounts to that.
Do you think there’s a “Bayesian reason” for having segregated schools?
I don’t know. If you can come up with a reason that depends on the higher probability that some races have some traits, I suppose there would be. I would of course like to see such a reason first.
If he got his opinion by updating it constantly and is willing to update it in the other direction given further evidence, yes. What he actually ends up doing with it is another matter entirely. I wouldn’t expect a Bayesian redneck to join the KKK, for example.
Is she a Bayesian racist?
I’d think she’s either committing the fallacy of trusting statistics to exactly predict the individual case, or simply not doing proper cost analysis. Even if the statistics say there are no unsolved crimes and none of the crimes are committed by Asians, the expected negative utility of running into the first Asian criminal in history should outweigh the inconvenience of avoiding one person on an otherwise empty street.
Even if the statistics say there are no unsolved crimes and none of the crimes are committed by Asians
In that hypothetical world, which is very different from ours, actively avoiding Asian males would be as weird as actively avoiding harmless old grannies, and doing weird things carries a nonzero social cost.
First, for the world outside of LW that’s a meaningless distinction.
Second, I’m not sure how do you know what the actual differences are. Doesn’t it boil down to the “Bayesian racists” being able to cite some science to support what they believe and the “non-Bayesian racists” not being able to?
Third, you still need to jump the gap between believing the races to be different and wanting to “decrease utility” of other people.
There is no gap. If you have reason to believe the races to be different, and act differently towards them based solely on this difference, you’re a Bayseian racist, and I do not claim that Bayseian racists want to decrease utility of other people. Non-Bayseian racists do; a non-Bayseian racist is different from a Bayseian racist.
So, let’s take some Southern redneck. He interacts with black people on a regular basis and based on his personal experience he came to the conclusion that they are pretty damn dumb, dumber than white rednecks, anyway. Does he have a “reason to believe”? Is he a Bayesian racist?
Or let’s take Alice. Alice knows the statistics about crime rates among black males and, say, Asian males. So on an empty street when she sees a black male she actively avoids him, but when she sees an Asian male she does not. Is she a Bayesian racist?
If there are no cognitive biases involved, sure. In practice, I think that would be unlikely.
On the other hand, someone who says “I find the presence of black people to be disgusting. I would not hire one because I don’t want to be near them” would be a non-Bayseian racist. There’s no Bayseian reason for, for instance, having segregated water fountains.
Given how much this was moderated down, I wonder how many people think there is a Bayseian reason for having segregated water fountains.
It’s Bayesian not Bayseian.
You’re using the word “Bayesian” here as a synonym for “rational”, right?
Do you think there’s a “Bayesian reason” for having segregated schools?
Well, Bayseian is a synonym for being rational (or for a subset of being rational), so it amounts to that.
I don’t know. If you can come up with a reason that depends on the higher probability that some races have some traits, I suppose there would be. I would of course like to see such a reason first.
8-0 No, it isn’t.
A Bayesian, in this context, is one who practices the Bayesian approach to uncertainty. Rationality is much wider than that.
If he got his opinion by updating it constantly and is willing to update it in the other direction given further evidence, yes. What he actually ends up doing with it is another matter entirely. I wouldn’t expect a Bayesian redneck to join the KKK, for example.
I’d think she’s either committing the fallacy of trusting statistics to exactly predict the individual case, or simply not doing proper cost analysis. Even if the statistics say there are no unsolved crimes and none of the crimes are committed by Asians, the expected negative utility of running into the first Asian criminal in history should outweigh the inconvenience of avoiding one person on an otherwise empty street.
In that hypothetical world, which is very different from ours, actively avoiding Asian males would be as weird as actively avoiding harmless old grannies, and doing weird things carries a nonzero social cost.