He begins by making a completely valid and important point: the possibility of getting killed by a nuclear war isn’t so very different in kind from the possibility of getting killed by a conventional war, or disease, or whatever.
He goes on to make a much more dubious point: the possibility of humanity or human civilization being wiped out by a nuclear war isn’t so very different in kind from the certainty (given current scientific understanding of the universe) that in the billions-to-googols-of-years long run we will all be dead. (If we’re wiped out thousands-to-millions of times sooner than we otherwise would be, that seems to me to be a difference of considerable importance.)
And he proceeds from there to a very dubious point indeed: if we don’t embrace some sort of supernaturalism (and in fact it had better be a rather specific kind of supernaturalism) then we are rationally obliged to stop falling in love, enjoying music, etc., because obviously as soon as you describe something as just or only something else it becomes clear that it has no real value.
And from there to a completely batshit insane point: from the fact that we none the less feel inclined to go on falling in love, enjoying music, etc., we should draw grand metaphysical conclusions that the world is not purely natural, that we are going to live for ever, that we were made for a world quite unlike this one in which we will live for ever, etc., etc., etc.
I know that I don’t want theist policy makers in critical high-stakes situations if they are going to delay looking for solutions because they’ve reasoned that God won’t have them killed like that, or because it doesn’t even matter to get killed.
Even worse, those people that think that certain actions will trigger their particular flavor of Armaggedon, like those evangelicals that want the Temple of Jerusalem to get rebuilt because it will trigger their endgame event.
He begins by making a completely valid and important point: the possibility of getting killed by a nuclear war isn’t so very different in kind from the possibility of getting killed by a conventional war, or disease, or whatever.
He goes on to make a much more dubious point: the possibility of humanity or human civilization being wiped out by a nuclear war isn’t so very different in kind from the certainty (given current scientific understanding of the universe) that in the billions-to-googols-of-years long run we will all be dead. (If we’re wiped out thousands-to-millions of times sooner than we otherwise would be, that seems to me to be a difference of considerable importance.)
And he proceeds from there to a very dubious point indeed: if we don’t embrace some sort of supernaturalism (and in fact it had better be a rather specific kind of supernaturalism) then we are rationally obliged to stop falling in love, enjoying music, etc., because obviously as soon as you describe something as just or only something else it becomes clear that it has no real value.
And from there to a completely batshit insane point: from the fact that we none the less feel inclined to go on falling in love, enjoying music, etc., we should draw grand metaphysical conclusions that the world is not purely natural, that we are going to live for ever, that we were made for a world quite unlike this one in which we will live for ever, etc., etc., etc.
This is your brain. This is your brain on religion. Any questions?
Good point. I’ve edited my note at the beginning accordingly.
I know that I don’t want theist policy makers in critical high-stakes situations if they are going to delay looking for solutions because they’ve reasoned that God won’t have them killed like that, or because it doesn’t even matter to get killed.
Even worse, those people that think that certain actions will trigger their particular flavor of Armaggedon, like those evangelicals that want the Temple of Jerusalem to get rebuilt because it will trigger their endgame event.