You’re too kind by far. A category which is cognitively economical but classes a few non-dangerous items into a largely dangerous category, or vice versa, can still be extremely useful. So a criticism which points to such an instance (Marxism) is weak. But a criticism which invents such an instance (Nazism a la Thor) is beyond weak. Categories prove their usefulness is the real world.
The problem is—to paraphrase pragmatist’s summary of the Hanson-Moldbug debate—Moldbug is thinking like a(n old-school analytic) philosopher. We need to think like social scientists on this one.
This seems reasonable on its face except for the implicit claim that Marxism isn’t dangerous. The history of the 20th century seems to indicate otherwise.
You’re too kind by far. A category which is cognitively economical but classes a few non-dangerous items into a largely dangerous category, or vice versa, can still be extremely useful. So a criticism which points to such an instance (Marxism) is weak. But a criticism which invents such an instance (Nazism a la Thor) is beyond weak. Categories prove their usefulness is the real world.
The problem is—to paraphrase pragmatist’s summary of the Hanson-Moldbug debate—Moldbug is thinking like a(n old-school analytic) philosopher. We need to think like social scientists on this one.
This seems reasonable on its face except for the implicit claim that Marxism isn’t dangerous. The history of the 20th century seems to indicate otherwise.
Huh? Did you miss the “or vice versa”?
Hmm. I think I did. Sorry about that.