when the stories found in the Bible were first told, were they claims of truth or mostly persuasion tricks?
I have no idea. Things were so vastly different back then I can’t possibly even mount an educated guess about that. What difference does it make how it started? Today, at least in the U.S., I think it’s a defensibly hypothesis that what people call “spiritual experiences” are largely about community and shared subjective experience.
spirituality also claims to have insight into some factual matters (history, for example) and moral dilemmas.
Sure, but that’s not the subject I’m addressing. The subject I’m addressing is the belief that many people in the rational community seem to hold (Dawkins being the most prominent example) that the only possible reason anyone could even profess to believe in God is because they are an idiot.
this doesnt look at all like the spirituality found in the world around us.
Yes, that’s mostly true (though I am personally acquainted with a number of people who profess to believe in God but who are otherwise seem perfectly rational). I’m not saying that the conclusions reached by religious people are correct. I’m simply advancing the hypothesis that religious people reach the conclusions that they do is in part that they have different subjective experiences than non-relgious people.
Dawkins being the most prominent example [...] the only possible reason anyone could even profess to believe in God is because they are an idiot.
Why do people feel free to write such rot about Richard Dawkins? In his book “The God Delusion” he says: “Great scientists who profess religion become harder to find through the twentieth century, but they are not particularly rare.” Do you think that is consistent with thinking that the only possible reason for professing belief in God is idiocy?
Well, OK, Dawkins doesn’t use the word “idiot.” He says that anyone who believes in God is suffering from “a pernicious delusion” (The God Delusion, Chapter 2). I think most people would say that distinguishing between idiocy and pernicious delusions is splitting a pretty fine hair. But be that as it may, the point is: Dawkins has absolutely no sympathy for religious belief of any kind for any reason. Or at least he didn’t in 2006. Maybe he’s mellowed since then. (But I met him in 2012 in a social setting and he told me, apropos of nothing, “I despise religion.”)
most people would say that distinguishing between idiocy and pernicious delusions is splitting a pretty fine hair
I think there’s a big difference. “Because they are an idiot” is saying something wide-ranging about that person’s nature: they’re just Not Very Bright. If someone is an idiot, we can expect them to be generally intellectually incompetent. “suffering from a pernicious delusion” is saying something much narrower about one area of their life: they are wrong about this one thing. If someone has a pernicious delusion, we can expect them to make serious errors about things closely related to that delusion, but aside from that they might be wise and ingenious and quick-witted and so forth. Pointing out the difference between these is not hair-splitting.
no sympathy for religious belief
That may be true (though so far as I can see the thing you link to doesn’t show that it is). But so what?
You cited Dawkins as an example of someone who believes the proposition you were arguing against: “that the only possible reason anyone could even profess to believe in God is because they are an idiot”. I don’t think he believes this. I know I don’t believe this. I really don’t think there are many rationalists who believe it.
Now, maybe what you’re actually arguing against is something broader—e.g., that we shouldn’t say unpleasant things about religion, or that we shouldn’t hold any negative opinion about religious people that goes beyond “they are probably wrong on such-and-such factual questions”. But so far as I can see the arguments you’ve been making aren’t of the right form to lead to such conclusions, even were they correct in every detail.
Of course it’s possible. That’s not the point. The point is that “pernicious delusion” is pejorative in much the same way that “idiot” is (which is why I extrapolated it that way). Both imply some sort of mental deficiency or disorder. If someone believes in God, on this view, it can only be because their brains are broken.
To be sure, some people do have broken brains, and some people believe in God as a result. The hypothesis that I’m advancing here is that some people may believe in God not because their brains are broken, but because they have had (real) subjective experiences that non-believers generally have not had.
Could you taboo ‘are [...] about’ in your “what people call “spiritual experiences” are largely about community and shared subjective experience.”?
Also your main point, that religious people reach their conclusions partly because they have experienced different things than non-religious people, is simply true. But why would you write a long metaphor-riddled piece about this, and give it the clickbait title “Is Spirituality Irrational?”. And even with this formulation there is still some Motte-and-Bailey going on if you intend to reconcile spirituality and rationality—just because different experiences were a contributing factor to accepting spirituality does not strongly support that spirituality and rationality can go hand-in-hand. Most importantly your final claim doesn’t seem to help in answering my ‘core conflict’ above.
But why would you write a long metaphor-riddled piece about this,
Because not everyone believes it to be true. And because metaphor can be an effective rhetorical device for some audiences.
and give it the clickbait title “Is Spirituality Irrational?”
Because it was written in response to an article entitled “Religious and Rational?”
Most importantly your final claim doesn’t seem to help in answering my ‘core conflict’ above.
I’m not sure what you’re referring to as my “final claim.” But my intent here is not to reconcile religion and rationality; that can’t be done. My intent here is just to try to provide an alternative explanation of how people arrive at religious conclusions than the “they are all idiots” hypothesis, with the hope that this might lead to more constructive dialog.
Ah, I see. OK, well, let me begin by re-stating my original disclaimer that I actually have no idea what the answer to the question is, and that this is pure speculation on my part. But with that firmly in mind, here’s my best shot at re-forumulation that speculation under this taboo.
Let’s recall the original question:
when the stories found in the Bible were first told, were they claims of truth or mostly persuasion tricks?
I don’t think this is an exhaustive enumeration of the possibilities. My guess (and I cannot emphasize that enough) is that they were (and remain) attempts to make sense of subjective experiences that many people actually do experience. In that sense they were more “claims of truth” than “persuasion tricks”.
However...
There is some evidence (I don’t have the references handy but I can probably find them if you really want to know) that the ancients view of truth and falsehood was very different from the modern conception. The ancients had at least three categories of “truth”, what we moderns would roughly call “objective physical truth”, “fiction or falsehood”, and “myth.” The ancients believed that a claim like, “And God said...” was of a very different nature than a claim like, “Achmed ate an apple yesterday.” Part of the problem with modern thought—and one of the reasons that it seems to lead to so many intractable arguments—is that we insist on getting rid of the “myth” category and lumping all claims into two buckets: objectively true or objectively false.
It is easy to see that this is problematic in other regimes, like artistic beauty. Most moderns readily recognize that it makes no sense to try to categorize a claim like, “Les Demoiselles D’Avignon is a beautiful painting” into “objectively true” or “objectively false.” (Note, however, that David Deutsch actually disputes this!) The ancients would have considered an attempt to categorize “the law was given by the gods” as “objectively true” or “objectively false” to be equally futile.
I have no idea. Things were so vastly different back then I can’t possibly even mount an educated guess about that. What difference does it make how it started? Today, at least in the U.S., I think it’s a defensibly hypothesis that what people call “spiritual experiences” are largely about community and shared subjective experience.
Sure, but that’s not the subject I’m addressing. The subject I’m addressing is the belief that many people in the rational community seem to hold (Dawkins being the most prominent example) that the only possible reason anyone could even profess to believe in God is because they are an idiot.
Yes, that’s mostly true (though I am personally acquainted with a number of people who profess to believe in God but who are otherwise seem perfectly rational). I’m not saying that the conclusions reached by religious people are correct. I’m simply advancing the hypothesis that religious people reach the conclusions that they do is in part that they have different subjective experiences than non-relgious people.
Why do people feel free to write such rot about Richard Dawkins? In his book “The God Delusion” he says: “Great scientists who profess religion become harder to find through the twentieth century, but they are not particularly rare.” Do you think that is consistent with thinking that the only possible reason for professing belief in God is idiocy?
Well, OK, Dawkins doesn’t use the word “idiot.” He says that anyone who believes in God is suffering from “a pernicious delusion” (The God Delusion, Chapter 2). I think most people would say that distinguishing between idiocy and pernicious delusions is splitting a pretty fine hair. But be that as it may, the point is: Dawkins has absolutely no sympathy for religious belief of any kind for any reason. Or at least he didn’t in 2006. Maybe he’s mellowed since then. (But I met him in 2012 in a social setting and he told me, apropos of nothing, “I despise religion.”)
I think there’s a big difference. “Because they are an idiot” is saying something wide-ranging about that person’s nature: they’re just Not Very Bright. If someone is an idiot, we can expect them to be generally intellectually incompetent. “suffering from a pernicious delusion” is saying something much narrower about one area of their life: they are wrong about this one thing. If someone has a pernicious delusion, we can expect them to make serious errors about things closely related to that delusion, but aside from that they might be wise and ingenious and quick-witted and so forth. Pointing out the difference between these is not hair-splitting.
That may be true (though so far as I can see the thing you link to doesn’t show that it is). But so what?
You cited Dawkins as an example of someone who believes the proposition you were arguing against: “that the only possible reason anyone could even profess to believe in God is because they are an idiot”. I don’t think he believes this. I know I don’t believe this. I really don’t think there are many rationalists who believe it.
Now, maybe what you’re actually arguing against is something broader—e.g., that we shouldn’t say unpleasant things about religion, or that we shouldn’t hold any negative opinion about religious people that goes beyond “they are probably wrong on such-and-such factual questions”. But so far as I can see the arguments you’ve been making aren’t of the right form to lead to such conclusions, even were they correct in every detail.
It is possible to be extremely intelligent, and suffer from a delusion.
Of course it’s possible. That’s not the point. The point is that “pernicious delusion” is pejorative in much the same way that “idiot” is (which is why I extrapolated it that way). Both imply some sort of mental deficiency or disorder. If someone believes in God, on this view, it can only be because their brains are broken.
To be sure, some people do have broken brains, and some people believe in God as a result. The hypothesis that I’m advancing here is that some people may believe in God not because their brains are broken, but because they have had (real) subjective experiences that non-believers generally have not had.
I am tapping out of this thread.
Could you taboo ‘are [...] about’ in your “what people call “spiritual experiences” are largely about community and shared subjective experience.”?
Also your main point, that religious people reach their conclusions partly because they have experienced different things than non-religious people, is simply true. But why would you write a long metaphor-riddled piece about this, and give it the clickbait title “Is Spirituality Irrational?”. And even with this formulation there is still some Motte-and-Bailey going on if you intend to reconcile spirituality and rationality—just because different experiences were a contributing factor to accepting spirituality does not strongly support that spirituality and rationality can go hand-in-hand. Most importantly your final claim doesn’t seem to help in answering my ‘core conflict’ above.
Sorry, that didn’t parse.
Because not everyone believes it to be true. And because metaphor can be an effective rhetorical device for some audiences.
Because it was written in response to an article entitled “Religious and Rational?”
I’m not sure what you’re referring to as my “final claim.” But my intent here is not to reconcile religion and rationality; that can’t be done. My intent here is just to try to provide an alternative explanation of how people arrive at religious conclusions than the “they are all idiots” hypothesis, with the hope that this might lead to more constructive dialog.
Taboo Your Words should provide the necessary context to parse TheMajor’s query.
I think.
Ah, I see. OK, well, let me begin by re-stating my original disclaimer that I actually have no idea what the answer to the question is, and that this is pure speculation on my part. But with that firmly in mind, here’s my best shot at re-forumulation that speculation under this taboo.
Let’s recall the original question:
I don’t think this is an exhaustive enumeration of the possibilities. My guess (and I cannot emphasize that enough) is that they were (and remain) attempts to make sense of subjective experiences that many people actually do experience. In that sense they were more “claims of truth” than “persuasion tricks”.
However...
There is some evidence (I don’t have the references handy but I can probably find them if you really want to know) that the ancients view of truth and falsehood was very different from the modern conception. The ancients had at least three categories of “truth”, what we moderns would roughly call “objective physical truth”, “fiction or falsehood”, and “myth.” The ancients believed that a claim like, “And God said...” was of a very different nature than a claim like, “Achmed ate an apple yesterday.” Part of the problem with modern thought—and one of the reasons that it seems to lead to so many intractable arguments—is that we insist on getting rid of the “myth” category and lumping all claims into two buckets: objectively true or objectively false.
It is easy to see that this is problematic in other regimes, like artistic beauty. Most moderns readily recognize that it makes no sense to try to categorize a claim like, “Les Demoiselles D’Avignon is a beautiful painting” into “objectively true” or “objectively false.” (Note, however, that David Deutsch actually disputes this!) The ancients would have considered an attempt to categorize “the law was given by the gods” as “objectively true” or “objectively false” to be equally futile.