While I can look up “symptom substitution”, I’ll to know more specifically what you mean by this. But I’d have to be convinced that PCT explains it first in a way that doesn’t smuggle in your commonsense reasoning.
Now, if you want examples of how commonsense reasoning leads to the same conclusions that are provided as examples of the success of PCT, that I already have by the boatload. This whole top-level post is an example of using commonsense reasoning but attributing it to PCT. For example, long before I was aware of the concept of a control system, or even feedback (as such) I handled my fears (as does virtually everyone else) by thinking through what exactly it is about the feared thing that worries me.
Furthermore, it is obvious to most people that if you believe obstacles X, Y, and Z are keeping you from pursuing goal G, you should think up ways to overcome X, Y, and Z, and yet Kaj here presents that as something derived from PCT.
While I can look up “symptom substitution”, I’ll to know more specifically what you mean by this.
Specifically, find a “commonsense” explanation that explains why symptom substitution takes time to occur, without reference to PCT’s notion of a perception averaged over time.
Googling “symptom substitution” lead me to a journal article that argued that people have tried and failed to find evidence that it happens...
That’s Freudian symptom substitution, and in any case, the article is splitting hairs: it says that if you stop a child sucking its thumb, and it finds some other way to get its needs met, then that doesn’t count as “symptom substitution”. (IOW, the authors of the paper more or less defined it into nonexistence, such that if it exists and makes sense, it’s not symptom substitution!)
Also, the paper raises the same objection to the Freudian model of symptom substitution that I do: namely, that there is no explanation of the time frame factor.
In contrast, PCT unifies the cases both ruled-in and ruled out by this paper, and offers a better explanation for the varying time frame issue, in that the time frame is governed by the perceptual decay of the controlled variable.
While I can look up “symptom substitution”, I’ll to know more specifically what you mean by this. But I’d have to be convinced that PCT explains it first in a way that doesn’t smuggle in your commonsense reasoning.
Now, if you want examples of how commonsense reasoning leads to the same conclusions that are provided as examples of the success of PCT, that I already have by the boatload. This whole top-level post is an example of using commonsense reasoning but attributing it to PCT. For example, long before I was aware of the concept of a control system, or even feedback (as such) I handled my fears (as does virtually everyone else) by thinking through what exactly it is about the feared thing that worries me.
Furthermore, it is obvious to most people that if you believe obstacles X, Y, and Z are keeping you from pursuing goal G, you should think up ways to overcome X, Y, and Z, and yet Kaj here presents that as something derived from PCT.
Specifically, find a “commonsense” explanation that explains why symptom substitution takes time to occur, without reference to PCT’s notion of a perception averaged over time.
Googling “symptom substitution” lead me to a journal article that argued that people have tried and failed to find evidence that it happens...
That’s Freudian symptom substitution, and in any case, the article is splitting hairs: it says that if you stop a child sucking its thumb, and it finds some other way to get its needs met, then that doesn’t count as “symptom substitution”. (IOW, the authors of the paper more or less defined it into nonexistence, such that if it exists and makes sense, it’s not symptom substitution!)
Also, the paper raises the same objection to the Freudian model of symptom substitution that I do: namely, that there is no explanation of the time frame factor.
In contrast, PCT unifies the cases both ruled-in and ruled out by this paper, and offers a better explanation for the varying time frame issue, in that the time frame is governed by the perceptual decay of the controlled variable.