What stops two people’s ideal should functions from being different? How different must they be for us to rightfully say:”they do not have the same sort of morality.”? How does this differ from subjectivism?
One more thing: How do we know if a moral argument is pushing me closer or further from my ideal morality function? What guarantee do we have that as time goes on we approximate some ultimate function of goodness, that could not be swayed by any argument? May it not be that my ultimate function would see slavery as BA, but that humanity has always filtered out the arguments that make slavery seem awesome? What if there is this set of arguments that would convince me that slavery is awesome, but they never come up in history. Basically I’m asking how we tell moral progress from moral corruption using your theory?
I like that this theory tells me how to go about figuring out moral things. If something seems moral after I hear about it, it probably is, and if everyone agrees with me, then it more probably is, and if those that don’t agree with me eventually do after some argument, then it more probably is, since there is nothing to judge morality besides our shouldness function. Ethics becomes a sort of cog-sci with this view, which is great. What i’d like to learn now, is why there are arguments. WHy do arguments persuade others, and why should we expect them to get us closer to our ideal morality, instead of further? I would presume that cognitive dissonance and a general urge to be logically consistent and use valid inference play a large role in convincing others in moral arguments, but if shouldness is a large function, and our only access to its output is introspection, and verbal report, then how do I get someone whom doesn’t feel icky about slavery to find it icky? Why wouldnt i expect them to just keep feeling cool about slavery? There is nothing inherently logically inconsistent or invalid about not finding slavery sweet. So why does everyone end up saying slavery is not sweet?
Chances are, that there have been dark side ethics, with the goal of tricking up your function so that it does output sweetness when given slavery. But I know how to tell dark side epistimology from good epistimology, check it for successful knowledge seeking, see if it is bayesian, etc. How do I tell darkside ethics from good ethics?
What stops two people’s ideal should functions from being different? How different must they be for us to rightfully say:”they do not have the same sort of morality.”? How does this differ from subjectivism?
One more thing: How do we know if a moral argument is pushing me closer or further from my ideal morality function? What guarantee do we have that as time goes on we approximate some ultimate function of goodness, that could not be swayed by any argument? May it not be that my ultimate function would see slavery as BA, but that humanity has always filtered out the arguments that make slavery seem awesome? What if there is this set of arguments that would convince me that slavery is awesome, but they never come up in history. Basically I’m asking how we tell moral progress from moral corruption using your theory?
I like that this theory tells me how to go about figuring out moral things. If something seems moral after I hear about it, it probably is, and if everyone agrees with me, then it more probably is, and if those that don’t agree with me eventually do after some argument, then it more probably is, since there is nothing to judge morality besides our shouldness function. Ethics becomes a sort of cog-sci with this view, which is great. What i’d like to learn now, is why there are arguments. WHy do arguments persuade others, and why should we expect them to get us closer to our ideal morality, instead of further? I would presume that cognitive dissonance and a general urge to be logically consistent and use valid inference play a large role in convincing others in moral arguments, but if shouldness is a large function, and our only access to its output is introspection, and verbal report, then how do I get someone whom doesn’t feel icky about slavery to find it icky? Why wouldnt i expect them to just keep feeling cool about slavery? There is nothing inherently logically inconsistent or invalid about not finding slavery sweet. So why does everyone end up saying slavery is not sweet?
Chances are, that there have been dark side ethics, with the goal of tricking up your function so that it does output sweetness when given slavery. But I know how to tell dark side epistimology from good epistimology, check it for successful knowledge seeking, see if it is bayesian, etc. How do I tell darkside ethics from good ethics?