I know this is an old post, but I started reading this particular sequence because I was hoping for clarification on a particular issue—“what is the nature of evil”—and I was hoping that an answer to “what is the nature of good” would answer my question on the way.
I read the whole sequence and came away, not disagreeing, but not clear of mind either. I know this sequence was years ago, but do you feel able to comment on the nature of evil? If it matter/helps, this is the place I’m starting from (I’m dracunculus: http://bateleur.livejournal.com/209732.html?thread=1684548#t1684548) As you can see, I’m predisposed to an evolutionary answer—“things that humans should not do” are distinct from “things that humboldt squid should not do.” I’m leaning towards jettisoning the whole concept of evil, and yet I do want to preserve that sense of angry, whole-body revulsion and condemnation that we feel—that we ought to feel—when confronted with something like child rape. Which is something that people do (and entire cultures justify doing).
The evolutionary-psychology explanation just feels insufficient, given that humans can differ on such fundamental matters as whether it’s okay to rape children. We’re so far apart. If all I have to offer is “evolution made me (and my culture) this way, therefore I believe it’s wrong—it’s evil—to rape children,” and yet another human subject to the same evolutionary processes (but a different culture) says “I believe raping children actually protects them from greater harm, and is therefore good”—how do we get past that impasse? What basis do I have for saying “you are wrong, and I am right?”
I guess what I’m asking is—in practice, how does your meta-ethics differ from a naive cultural relativism? I get that your your moral framework references something outside human culture, in the same way that mathematics references something outside human culture, but there’s this huge blank area there—because you’re encompassing the way our opinions would change if we were exposed to all possible arguments. THAT’s what makes your metaethics more “objective” than basic cultural relativism.
But it doesn’t help me, when I’m exposed to someone from a completely alien culture, determine whether they are right or I am. We’d have to go through all possible arguments, we’d have to hit “those justifications, that would sway me if I heard them.” I can never know if we’ve hit those justifications or not. All I’m left with is the knowledge that my culture says this (and they don’t find it persuasive) and their culture says that (and I don’t find it persuasive). I’m not confused about whether child rape is right or wrong. I’m quite convinced that it’s wrong. I just don’t see how your morality sequence helps to argue the fact against another neurologically-intact human (from a very different cultural background) who is convinced otherwise.
“things that humans should not do” are distinct from “things that humboldt squid should not do.”
It’s possible that there is a thing that humans should not do and humbolt squid should not do.
On the other tentacle, as humans differ from each other, there is no reason to think that every thing one particular human should not do is necessarily something all other humans should not do. “the same evolutionary processes” isn’t quite true, or I wouldn’t be able to do barely more push-ups than pull-ups, for example. (However many one can do of either, the ratio for most people is many push-ups per pull-up.)
whether they are right or I am.
That’s like asking who the protagonist in WickedandThe Wizard of Oz is.
I just don’t see how your morality sequence helps to argue the fact against another neurologically-intact human (from a very different cultural background) who is convinced otherwise.
They are compelled to see that I think it is wrong, and that it is not universally objectively not-wrong, and that it doesn’t square with other values of theirs (if it doesn’t, which it probably won’t, though it will for some that are less like the other humans), and that my values don’t postulate a deontological impurity to using force against them if persuasion isn’t enough.
If I am in another culture, there may not be a sequence of words to convince them of my point of view. What the morality sequence does is make one comfortable with using violence against those who rape children. There’s no magic spell to utter to convince all possible minds, so it’s OK to resort to the last resort. It’s OK even though my values are the result of my circumstances, as are theirs—it’s OK by my values.
As for those whose values say it’s always right to use violence against me, or against anyone, or just to uphold the right to rape children, or whatever, I’ll try and convince them otherwise, and failing that I’ll use force against them and not blind myself to the fact I can’t necessarily convince them otherwise. Humans are sufficiently similar to me that most will agree, in fact an illusion that there is one true “right” may emerge from right(me) being so similar to right(you) and right(him) and right(her).
As for those who think they think that child rape is always wrong and that the use of violence is always wrong, I’d like to convince them, it would be useful to convince them, all else equal I don’t want to compel them to do anything, but I don’t feel the need to try and contrive an argument to convince every one of them because it’s not necessarily possible. I don’t have to convince each of them, I am determined to be happy in a world where others disagree, I’ll not let them get in my way of opposing child rape, and I am determined to use no more or less violence than is optimal whether they are a multitude shrieking at me to never use force or they blink out of existence and every extant being glories in violence.
I know this is an old post, but I started reading this particular sequence because I was hoping for clarification on a particular issue—“what is the nature of evil”—and I was hoping that an answer to “what is the nature of good” would answer my question on the way.
I read the whole sequence and came away, not disagreeing, but not clear of mind either. I know this sequence was years ago, but do you feel able to comment on the nature of evil? If it matter/helps, this is the place I’m starting from (I’m dracunculus: http://bateleur.livejournal.com/209732.html?thread=1684548#t1684548) As you can see, I’m predisposed to an evolutionary answer—“things that humans should not do” are distinct from “things that humboldt squid should not do.” I’m leaning towards jettisoning the whole concept of evil, and yet I do want to preserve that sense of angry, whole-body revulsion and condemnation that we feel—that we ought to feel—when confronted with something like child rape. Which is something that people do (and entire cultures justify doing).
The evolutionary-psychology explanation just feels insufficient, given that humans can differ on such fundamental matters as whether it’s okay to rape children. We’re so far apart. If all I have to offer is “evolution made me (and my culture) this way, therefore I believe it’s wrong—it’s evil—to rape children,” and yet another human subject to the same evolutionary processes (but a different culture) says “I believe raping children actually protects them from greater harm, and is therefore good”—how do we get past that impasse? What basis do I have for saying “you are wrong, and I am right?”
I guess what I’m asking is—in practice, how does your meta-ethics differ from a naive cultural relativism? I get that your your moral framework references something outside human culture, in the same way that mathematics references something outside human culture, but there’s this huge blank area there—because you’re encompassing the way our opinions would change if we were exposed to all possible arguments. THAT’s what makes your metaethics more “objective” than basic cultural relativism.
But it doesn’t help me, when I’m exposed to someone from a completely alien culture, determine whether they are right or I am. We’d have to go through all possible arguments, we’d have to hit “those justifications, that would sway me if I heard them.” I can never know if we’ve hit those justifications or not. All I’m left with is the knowledge that my culture says this (and they don’t find it persuasive) and their culture says that (and I don’t find it persuasive). I’m not confused about whether child rape is right or wrong. I’m quite convinced that it’s wrong. I just don’t see how your morality sequence helps to argue the fact against another neurologically-intact human (from a very different cultural background) who is convinced otherwise.
It’s possible that there is a thing that humans should not do and humbolt squid should not do.
On the other tentacle, as humans differ from each other, there is no reason to think that every thing one particular human should not do is necessarily something all other humans should not do. “the same evolutionary processes” isn’t quite true, or I wouldn’t be able to do barely more push-ups than pull-ups, for example. (However many one can do of either, the ratio for most people is many push-ups per pull-up.)
That’s like asking who the protagonist in Wicked and The Wizard of Oz is.
They are compelled to see that I think it is wrong, and that it is not universally objectively not-wrong, and that it doesn’t square with other values of theirs (if it doesn’t, which it probably won’t, though it will for some that are less like the other humans), and that my values don’t postulate a deontological impurity to using force against them if persuasion isn’t enough.
If I am in another culture, there may not be a sequence of words to convince them of my point of view. What the morality sequence does is make one comfortable with using violence against those who rape children. There’s no magic spell to utter to convince all possible minds, so it’s OK to resort to the last resort. It’s OK even though my values are the result of my circumstances, as are theirs—it’s OK by my values.
As for those whose values say it’s always right to use violence against me, or against anyone, or just to uphold the right to rape children, or whatever, I’ll try and convince them otherwise, and failing that I’ll use force against them and not blind myself to the fact I can’t necessarily convince them otherwise. Humans are sufficiently similar to me that most will agree, in fact an illusion that there is one true “right” may emerge from right(me) being so similar to right(you) and right(him) and right(her).
As for those who think they think that child rape is always wrong and that the use of violence is always wrong, I’d like to convince them, it would be useful to convince them, all else equal I don’t want to compel them to do anything, but I don’t feel the need to try and contrive an argument to convince every one of them because it’s not necessarily possible. I don’t have to convince each of them, I am determined to be happy in a world where others disagree, I’ll not let them get in my way of opposing child rape, and I am determined to use no more or less violence than is optimal whether they are a multitude shrieking at me to never use force or they blink out of existence and every extant being glories in violence.
This is helpful. Thank you.