Our moral reasoning is ultimately grounded in our moral intuitions
I don’t accept the premise. Moral intuitions play a part, but the ultimate constraints come more from the nature of rational discourse and the psychology of the discoursing species. For extended arguments along these lines (well mostly the emphasized part) see Jürgen Habermas and Thomas Scanlon.
Isn’t “the psychology of the discoursing species” another way of saying “moral intuitions”? Or at least, those are included in the umbrella of that term.
Yes, they’re included. Well said. I believe this way of putting it, however, supports my criticism of the phrase “ultimately grounded in our moral intuitions;” the phrase is badly incomplete.
I don’t accept the premise. Moral intuitions play a part, but the ultimate constraints come more from the nature of rational discourse and the psychology of the discoursing species. For extended arguments along these lines (well mostly the emphasized part) see Jürgen Habermas and Thomas Scanlon.
Isn’t “the psychology of the discoursing species” another way of saying “moral intuitions”? Or at least, those are included in the umbrella of that term.
Yes, they’re included. Well said. I believe this way of putting it, however, supports my criticism of the phrase “ultimately grounded in our moral intuitions;” the phrase is badly incomplete.