Question for philosophers: Is it not so that the set of possible actions a Kantian could perform is a subset of the set of possible actions a Utilitarian could perform? If this is true, could not a Utilitarian decide that Kantian behavior is optimal for maximizing utility, and thus emulate a Kantian’s behavior in any given situation (similar to Rule Utilitarianism)? Of course, the reverse is not possible: a Kantian would never decide to emulate Utilitarian behavior.
This is correct. The Universal Law Formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative states, roughly:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.
In considering the maxim “Act so as to maximize total utility” (for some specific definition of utility), a Kantian would attempt to universalize it and ask “what would the world look like if everybody followed this maxim?” The merits of the maxim would then be judged against other possible maxims (or combinations thereof) by comparing the resulting worlds.
As a contrived example: A Kantian might consider the problem of “lawn crossing”. Specifically, is it right or permissible to walk directly across the grass instead of taking the path around it? If we universalize this, then we have a world where everyone crosses the grass so the grass gets trampled and dies. The Kantian might then conclude that this world is inferior to the one where everybody takes the path around, therefore the Kantian would conclude that it is wrong for anyone to cross the grass.
Is it not so that the set of possible actions a Kantian could perform is a subset of the set of possible actions a Utilitarian could perform?
It depends on how you want to describe actions. So, on the one hand a good Kantian will never lie while a good utilitarian might, on the other hand a good utilitarian will never minimize utility, whereas a good Kantian might.
Kant and your average utilitarian will disagree not only about on-the-ground ethical questions, but about questions like ‘what is an action’ and ‘how are actions individuated’ and ‘what constitutes the “consequences” of an action’. This makes translation between the two theories difficult.
If this is true, could not a Utilitarian decide that Kantian behavior is optimal for maximizing utility, and thus emulate a Kantian’s behavior in any given situation (similar to Rule Utilitarianism)?
Absolutely, though it’s hard to see what sort of utility calculation would conclude that Kantianism is going to optimize for utility in any given situation. Kant is explicit that the actual consequences of an action are totally irrelevant to its moral value. So it would be one heck of a coincidence. Needless to say, the Kant-emulating utilitarian would never be fulfilling her moral obligations in the Kant’s eyes, regardless of how complete the emulation is. For a Kant, it’s important that actions be motivated (or at least constrained) by a respect for the moral law; returning the jacket out of respect for the moral law and returning it in order to maximize utility don’t even count as the same action so far as Kant is concerned, since the maxims differ.
Question for philosophers: Is it not so that the set of possible actions a Kantian could perform is a subset of the set of possible actions a Utilitarian could perform? If this is true, could not a Utilitarian decide that Kantian behavior is optimal for maximizing utility, and thus emulate a Kantian’s behavior in any given situation (similar to Rule Utilitarianism)? Of course, the reverse is not possible: a Kantian would never decide to emulate Utilitarian behavior.
“Act so as to maximize total utility” (for any specific definition of utility) is just one of the maxims a Kantian could in principle follow.
This is correct. The Universal Law Formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative states, roughly:
In considering the maxim “Act so as to maximize total utility” (for some specific definition of utility), a Kantian would attempt to universalize it and ask “what would the world look like if everybody followed this maxim?” The merits of the maxim would then be judged against other possible maxims (or combinations thereof) by comparing the resulting worlds.
As a contrived example: A Kantian might consider the problem of “lawn crossing”. Specifically, is it right or permissible to walk directly across the grass instead of taking the path around it? If we universalize this, then we have a world where everyone crosses the grass so the grass gets trampled and dies. The Kantian might then conclude that this world is inferior to the one where everybody takes the path around, therefore the Kantian would conclude that it is wrong for anyone to cross the grass.
It depends on how you want to describe actions. So, on the one hand a good Kantian will never lie while a good utilitarian might, on the other hand a good utilitarian will never minimize utility, whereas a good Kantian might.
Kant and your average utilitarian will disagree not only about on-the-ground ethical questions, but about questions like ‘what is an action’ and ‘how are actions individuated’ and ‘what constitutes the “consequences” of an action’. This makes translation between the two theories difficult.
Absolutely, though it’s hard to see what sort of utility calculation would conclude that Kantianism is going to optimize for utility in any given situation. Kant is explicit that the actual consequences of an action are totally irrelevant to its moral value. So it would be one heck of a coincidence. Needless to say, the Kant-emulating utilitarian would never be fulfilling her moral obligations in the Kant’s eyes, regardless of how complete the emulation is. For a Kant, it’s important that actions be motivated (or at least constrained) by a respect for the moral law; returning the jacket out of respect for the moral law and returning it in order to maximize utility don’t even count as the same action so far as Kant is concerned, since the maxims differ.
Thank you for the cogent response. I believe that answers it quite well.