I don’t propose to defend Exodus 11. It’s a difficult passage from within a theological framework (which I’m sure you recall), but even more difficult when taken in isolation from the whole counsel of scripture. I struggle with it myself, and I suspect I’m meant to do so. But I do have to insist that we either differentiate between ethics and theology, or admit up front that there is a commitment to assuming God is made in man’s image, and not the other way around.
I fear that in my zeal, I may have drifted into waters I didn’t intend to swim in. Eliezer’s point is that religion can be disproven. How does he prove it can be disproven? By showing aspects of a particular religion(s) that are disprovable.
Do I agree that religion can be disproven? Sure, some of it. It really depends on what we count as religion. What I really found myself reacting strongly to was the paragraph that begins
Back in the old days, people actually believed their religions instead of just believing in them.
Perhaps I did violence to his thought, but my point is that all of us, I think, believe in things (believe them despite contrary evidence). (I understand that he may have meant that people believe despite a sense of the futility of belief. To me, this is not belief. Doubt is not the same as despair. If there is no content to the belief, and no content believed, then it is nothing but superstition and lies) To me, the idea of reducing bias smacks of an anxious, pre-Kuhnian rationalism—a return to Platonic ideal. Ironically, as a Christian, I found myself occupying Sophistic territory. To reduce bias is actually to substitute one bias for another. For instance, we might reduce the bias we find in interpreting things through a Christian lens by substituting the bias of a scientific, rationalistic lens (which aspires to a non-lens, but is a lens nonetheless).
My goal is not to prove Christianity here, but to express doubt at the idea that it is disprovable merely by these machinations.
Chris,
I’m intrigued by your comment about the bible being folklore, and especially that the NT is propaganda. I suppose if we take Jesus to be a Jewish revolutionary, I could see the Jewish apocalyptic propaganda, but where do you find the Roman imperialist propaganda?
I’m intrigued by your comment about the bible being folklore, and especially that the NT is propaganda. I suppose if we take Jesus to be a Jewish revolutionary, I could see the Jewish apocalyptic propaganda, but where do you find the Roman imperialist propaganda?
It’s a staple of higher biblical criticism; I no longer read much of it, but from what I remember, a number of Gospel features and language are there specifically to endorse the Roman hegemony and try to make early Christianity appear harmless and compatible with it.
Off the top of my head: ‘render unto Caesar’, and the blood-guilt of Jesus’s martyrdom being put on the Jews and not the Romans/Pontius Pilate (Pilate as depicted in the Gospels is an absurd farrago of fiction, as a comparison with the narrow-minded blood-thirsty Pilate of Josephus will readily demonstrate).
G,
I don’t propose to defend Exodus 11. It’s a difficult passage from within a theological framework (which I’m sure you recall), but even more difficult when taken in isolation from the whole counsel of scripture. I struggle with it myself, and I suspect I’m meant to do so. But I do have to insist that we either differentiate between ethics and theology, or admit up front that there is a commitment to assuming God is made in man’s image, and not the other way around.
I fear that in my zeal, I may have drifted into waters I didn’t intend to swim in. Eliezer’s point is that religion can be disproven. How does he prove it can be disproven? By showing aspects of a particular religion(s) that are disprovable.
Do I agree that religion can be disproven? Sure, some of it. It really depends on what we count as religion. What I really found myself reacting strongly to was the paragraph that begins
Back in the old days, people actually believed their religions instead of just believing in them.
Perhaps I did violence to his thought, but my point is that all of us, I think, believe in things (believe them despite contrary evidence). (I understand that he may have meant that people believe despite a sense of the futility of belief. To me, this is not belief. Doubt is not the same as despair. If there is no content to the belief, and no content believed, then it is nothing but superstition and lies) To me, the idea of reducing bias smacks of an anxious, pre-Kuhnian rationalism—a return to Platonic ideal. Ironically, as a Christian, I found myself occupying Sophistic territory. To reduce bias is actually to substitute one bias for another. For instance, we might reduce the bias we find in interpreting things through a Christian lens by substituting the bias of a scientific, rationalistic lens (which aspires to a non-lens, but is a lens nonetheless).
My goal is not to prove Christianity here, but to express doubt at the idea that it is disprovable merely by these machinations.
Chris,
I’m intrigued by your comment about the bible being folklore, and especially that the NT is propaganda. I suppose if we take Jesus to be a Jewish revolutionary, I could see the Jewish apocalyptic propaganda, but where do you find the Roman imperialist propaganda?
Best,
DB
It’s a staple of higher biblical criticism; I no longer read much of it, but from what I remember, a number of Gospel features and language are there specifically to endorse the Roman hegemony and try to make early Christianity appear harmless and compatible with it.
Off the top of my head: ‘render unto Caesar’, and the blood-guilt of Jesus’s martyrdom being put on the Jews and not the Romans/Pontius Pilate (Pilate as depicted in the Gospels is an absurd farrago of fiction, as a comparison with the narrow-minded blood-thirsty Pilate of Josephus will readily demonstrate).