I think you’re mistakenly equivocating between “wrong with” referring to morality and rational justification. If there are no moral truths, then of course it’s not immoral to believe there are moral truths, but it’s not epistemically rational, which is the relevant point among people who care about epistemic rationality.
The point Daniel makes about morality—that your actions if you don’t believe in moral truths should be the same as those if you do—IS relevant to people who care about INSTRUMENTAL epistemic rationality (the irrelevance of this matter is relevant if you get what I mean)
“Mistakenly equivocating” is not quite fair. It’s plainly obvious that he meant “wrong” in the moral sense, considering he literally opened with “if there are no ethical truths…”. (Plus, I’m taking “assume” to mean “act as though” rather than “believe”, which also solves your point of disagreement)
What’s wrong with not following epistemic rationality then if there are no moral truths? If there are no moral truths, it doesn’t matter whether you are rational or not; no option is better than the other.
I think you’re mistakenly equivocating between “wrong with” referring to morality and rational justification. If there are no moral truths, then of course it’s not immoral to believe there are moral truths, but it’s not epistemically rational, which is the relevant point among people who care about epistemic rationality.
The point Daniel makes about morality—that your actions if you don’t believe in moral truths should be the same as those if you do—IS relevant to people who care about INSTRUMENTAL epistemic rationality (the irrelevance of this matter is relevant if you get what I mean)
“Mistakenly equivocating” is not quite fair. It’s plainly obvious that he meant “wrong” in the moral sense, considering he literally opened with “if there are no ethical truths…”. (Plus, I’m taking “assume” to mean “act as though” rather than “believe”, which also solves your point of disagreement)
What’s wrong with not following epistemic rationality then if there are no moral truths? If there are no moral truths, it doesn’t matter whether you are rational or not; no option is better than the other.
It’s relevant to what they care about, but what does it matter if their desires are fulfilled?
But if there are no moral truths, then there’s nothing morally wrong with being factually wrong, so who cares if you’re factually wrong?
You do, as long as you have subjective wants or needs that need accurate information to be met.
Anyone may care about anything they want. Particularly if there are no moral truths.
(If there are no moral truths, then what do you care if I care if people are factually wrong? ;) )