People who agree on Is and Ought can disagree on strategy. Disagreement about strategy takes two broad categories: disagreement about the vocabulary of relationships to represent the strategy, and disagreement about the specific construction and execution of the strategy.
Now you can say that this is secretly just is and ought problems all the way down. but this is like Objectivists being able to come up with a selfish interpretation for everything, it says more about the flexibility (degrees of freedom) in their explanatory schema than it is actually predictive. I can equally claim that Is and Ought are just two different kinds of data that strategies can return. Which I do think is more reasonable since we have direct access to neither Is nor Ought but can compare strategies’ performance to one another.
As far as being predictive, I think I’ve done a clear job of that already. I’m not just saying you can fit any disagreement into my model with enough mental gymnastics; I’m saying that doing so is concretely useful in guiding the resolution of that disagreement. My model could very well be overly flexible or generally incorrect in some cases, but it’s the most useful model for this topic that I’ve come up with. If you think modelling disagreements at the strategy level is more useful, I would greatly enjoy reading your post on how to make use of that for conflict resolution.
we have direct access to neither Is nor Ought but can compare strategies’ performance to one another
I don’t understand this part. The only way in which we don’t have direct access to Is or Ought is a fairly philosophical one, and on that level we don’t have direct access to the performance of our strategies either?
Assuming indirect realism, then we don’t have direct access to the performance of our strategies either, so I’m not sure how that ends up being more useful.
People who agree on Is and Ought can disagree on strategy. Disagreement about strategy takes two broad categories: disagreement about the vocabulary of relationships to represent the strategy, and disagreement about the specific construction and execution of the strategy.
Now you can say that this is secretly just is and ought problems all the way down. but this is like Objectivists being able to come up with a selfish interpretation for everything, it says more about the flexibility (degrees of freedom) in their explanatory schema than it is actually predictive. I can equally claim that Is and Ought are just two different kinds of data that strategies can return. Which I do think is more reasonable since we have direct access to neither Is nor Ought but can compare strategies’ performance to one another.
As far as being predictive, I think I’ve done a clear job of that already. I’m not just saying you can fit any disagreement into my model with enough mental gymnastics; I’m saying that doing so is concretely useful in guiding the resolution of that disagreement. My model could very well be overly flexible or generally incorrect in some cases, but it’s the most useful model for this topic that I’ve come up with. If you think modelling disagreements at the strategy level is more useful, I would greatly enjoy reading your post on how to make use of that for conflict resolution.
If Is considerations are like Aristotle’s Material Cause
Ought considerations like Final Cause
Language considerations like Formal Cause (if we extend language to include non-verbal but still symbolic representations of other sorts as well)
Then we only need to add Efficient Cause.
I don’t understand this part. The only way in which we don’t have direct access to Is or Ought is a fairly philosophical one, and on that level we don’t have direct access to the performance of our strategies either?
>The only way in which we don’t have direct access to Is or Ought is a fairly philosophical one
Sounds like maybe you’re not an indirect realist and if so it would take a bunch to reconcile on this.
Assuming indirect realism, then we don’t have direct access to the performance of our strategies either, so I’m not sure how that ends up being more useful.
We use comparison, which is itself a strategy. We do the same when we investigate an Is or an Ought.