The notion of probability to which you are pointing is the frequentist notion of probability. Eliezer favors the Bayesian notion of probability over the Frequentist notion.
1⁄4 is a precise description of reality if our scope is not just one day but a whole year.
That might be true but a person who knows more about the weather might make a more accurate prediction about whether it shows. If I saw the weather report I might conclude that it’s p=0.2 that it snows today even if over the whole year the distribution is that it snows on average every fourth day.
If I have more prior information I will predict a different probability that it actually snows.
The notion of probability to which you are pointing is the frequentist notion of probability. Eliezer favors the Bayesian notion of probability over the Frequentist notion.
That might be true but a person who knows more about the weather might make a more accurate prediction about whether it shows. If I saw the weather report I might conclude that it’s p=0.2 that it snows today even if over the whole year the distribution is that it snows on average every fourth day.
If I have more prior information I will predict a different probability that it actually snows.