michael vassar, I’m familiar with that book. I haven’t read it, but I listened to an hour-long interview with the author here: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/261
I think that the author made many good points there, and I take his theses seriously. However, I don’t think that secrecy is usually the best solution to the problems he points out. I favor structuring the institutions of power so that “cooler heads prevail”, rather than trying to keep “warmer heads” ignorant. Decision makers should ultimately be answerable to the people, but various procedural safeguards such as indirect representation (e.g., the electoral college), checks-and-balances, requiring super-majorities, and so forth, can help ameliorate the impulsiveness or wrong-headedness of the masses.
And I think that by-and-large, people understand the need for safeguards like these. Many might not like some of the specific safeguards we use. The electoral college certainly has come in for a lot of criticism. But most people understand, to some degree, the frailties of human nature that make safeguards of some kind necessary. Enough of us are in the minority on some position so that most of us don’t want the whim of the majority to be always instantly satisfied. In some liberals, this manifests as a desire that the courts overturn laws passed by a majority of the legislature. In some conservatives, this manifests as support for the theory of the unitary executive. But the underlying problem seems to be recognized across the spectrum.
So, in effect, I’m arguing that the people can be counted on to vote away their right to completely control scientific research. Indeed, they have already done this by implementing the kinds of procedural safeguards I mentioned above.
I realize that that might appear to conflict with my skepticism that they would vote away their right to know about the existential risks of the research they fund. But I think that there’s a big difference. In the former case, the people are saying, “we shouldn’t be able to influence research unless we care enough to work really, really hard to do so.” In the latter case, you’re asking them to say, “we shouldn’t even know about the research so that, no matter how much we would care if we were to know, still we can do nothing about it.” It seems unrealistic to me to expect that, except in special cases like military research.
So I don’t think that secrecy is necessary in general to protect science from public ignorance. Other, better, means are available. Now, in this post I’ve emphasized an “institutional safeguards” argument, because I think that that most directly addresses the issues raised by the book you mentioned. But I still maintain my original argument, which is that it’s easier to convince the public to fund risky research than it is to convince them to fund risky research and to vote that it be kept secret from them. This seemed to be the argument of mine that engendered the most skepticism, but I don’t yet see what’s causing the incredulity, so I don’t know what would make that argument seem more plausible to the doubters or, alternatively, why I should abandon it.
michael vassar, I’m familiar with that book. I haven’t read it, but I listened to an hour-long interview with the author here: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/261
I think that the author made many good points there, and I take his theses seriously. However, I don’t think that secrecy is usually the best solution to the problems he points out. I favor structuring the institutions of power so that “cooler heads prevail”, rather than trying to keep “warmer heads” ignorant. Decision makers should ultimately be answerable to the people, but various procedural safeguards such as indirect representation (e.g., the electoral college), checks-and-balances, requiring super-majorities, and so forth, can help ameliorate the impulsiveness or wrong-headedness of the masses.
And I think that by-and-large, people understand the need for safeguards like these. Many might not like some of the specific safeguards we use. The electoral college certainly has come in for a lot of criticism. But most people understand, to some degree, the frailties of human nature that make safeguards of some kind necessary. Enough of us are in the minority on some position so that most of us don’t want the whim of the majority to be always instantly satisfied. In some liberals, this manifests as a desire that the courts overturn laws passed by a majority of the legislature. In some conservatives, this manifests as support for the theory of the unitary executive. But the underlying problem seems to be recognized across the spectrum.
So, in effect, I’m arguing that the people can be counted on to vote away their right to completely control scientific research. Indeed, they have already done this by implementing the kinds of procedural safeguards I mentioned above.
I realize that that might appear to conflict with my skepticism that they would vote away their right to know about the existential risks of the research they fund. But I think that there’s a big difference. In the former case, the people are saying, “we shouldn’t be able to influence research unless we care enough to work really, really hard to do so.” In the latter case, you’re asking them to say, “we shouldn’t even know about the research so that, no matter how much we would care if we were to know, still we can do nothing about it.” It seems unrealistic to me to expect that, except in special cases like military research.
So I don’t think that secrecy is necessary in general to protect science from public ignorance. Other, better, means are available. Now, in this post I’ve emphasized an “institutional safeguards” argument, because I think that that most directly addresses the issues raised by the book you mentioned. But I still maintain my original argument, which is that it’s easier to convince the public to fund risky research than it is to convince them to fund risky research and to vote that it be kept secret from them. This seemed to be the argument of mine that engendered the most skepticism, but I don’t yet see what’s causing the incredulity, so I don’t know what would make that argument seem more plausible to the doubters or, alternatively, why I should abandon it.