You seem to be assuming your conclusion by taking maximization of value as axiom.
It’s contradictory to say that something of lesser value is what should be preferred—if so, then what does “lesser value” mean? If something has greater value, we prefer it—that’s what it means for something to have greater value.
The fat man happens to be my friend. I see a guy trying to push him and shoot that guy (edit: fully aware that he tried to save the five). Would you call me a murderer (in the moral sense not the legal)? Or would you acknowledge that I acted defending my friend and just point out that the five who are now dead might have made this outcome less preferable?
I wouldn’t call you a murderer because you didn’t kill the five people, and only killed in the defense of another. As for whether the five being dead makes the outcome less preferable, it’s important to remember that value is agent-relative, and “less preferable” presumes an agent who has those preferences. Assuming everyone involved is a stranger to me, I have no reason to value any of them more highly than the others, and since I assign a positive value to human life, I would prefer the preservation of the greater number of lives. On the other hand, you value the life of your friend more than you value the lives of five strangers (and the person trying to save them), so you act based on what you value more highly. There is no requirement that we should agree about what is more valuable—what is more valuable for me may be less valuable for you. (This is why I’m not a utilitarian, despite being a consequentialist.) Since I value the lives of five strangers more highly, I should save them. You value your friend more highly, so you should save him.
We agree on this point. But suppose that the fat man is a stranger to you, and the five people tied to the tracks are strangers as well. If you assign a positive value to strangers’ lives, the five people have a greater value than the one person. So in this case you should push the fat stranger, even though you shouldn’t push your friend.
So if the fat man was not my friend but just as much a stranger as the five you would call me a murderer? Because if not, I guess on some level you acknowledge that I operate under a different moral framework that I tried to explicate as agency ethics.
Whether you’re a murderer depends on whether you caused the situation, i.e. tied the five to the tracks. If you discover the situation (not having caused it) and then do nothing and don’t save the five, you’re not a murderer. Once you discover the situation, you should save whomever you value more. If the fat man is your friend, you should save him, if everyone is a stranger, then you should save the five and kill the fat man.
What if there are no five people on the track but a cat and I just happen to value the cat more than the fat man? Should I push him? If not, what makes that scenario different, i.e. why does it matter if a human life is at stake?
You should save whatever you value more, whether it’s a human, a cat, a loaf of bread (if you’re a kind of being who really really likes bread and/or doesn’t care about human life), or whatever.
It’s contradictory to say that something of lesser value is what should be preferred—if so, then what does “lesser value” mean? If something has greater value, we prefer it—that’s what it means for something to have greater value.
I wouldn’t call you a murderer because you didn’t kill the five people, and only killed in the defense of another. As for whether the five being dead makes the outcome less preferable, it’s important to remember that value is agent-relative, and “less preferable” presumes an agent who has those preferences. Assuming everyone involved is a stranger to me, I have no reason to value any of them more highly than the others, and since I assign a positive value to human life, I would prefer the preservation of the greater number of lives. On the other hand, you value the life of your friend more than you value the lives of five strangers (and the person trying to save them), so you act based on what you value more highly. There is no requirement that we should agree about what is more valuable—what is more valuable for me may be less valuable for you. (This is why I’m not a utilitarian, despite being a consequentialist.) Since I value the lives of five strangers more highly, I should save them. You value your friend more highly, so you should save him.
Then I guess we actually agree.
We agree on this point. But suppose that the fat man is a stranger to you, and the five people tied to the tracks are strangers as well. If you assign a positive value to strangers’ lives, the five people have a greater value than the one person. So in this case you should push the fat stranger, even though you shouldn’t push your friend.
So if the fat man was not my friend but just as much a stranger as the five you would call me a murderer? Because if not, I guess on some level you acknowledge that I operate under a different moral framework that I tried to explicate as agency ethics.
Whether you’re a murderer depends on whether you caused the situation, i.e. tied the five to the tracks. If you discover the situation (not having caused it) and then do nothing and don’t save the five, you’re not a murderer. Once you discover the situation, you should save whomever you value more. If the fat man is your friend, you should save him, if everyone is a stranger, then you should save the five and kill the fat man.
What if there are no five people on the track but a cat and I just happen to value the cat more than the fat man? Should I push him? If not, what makes that scenario different, i.e. why does it matter if a human life is at stake?
You should save whatever you value more, whether it’s a human, a cat, a loaf of bread (if you’re a kind of being who really really likes bread and/or doesn’t care about human life), or whatever.