Sorry. I have reacted only to a part of your previous comment, but not to your original argument. So, uhm, here is a bit silly scenario that examines agency:
There is a terrorist somewhere, holding your family as hostages. He announced that he is going to execute them in five minutes.
There are no policemen nearby, and they can’t get there in five minutes. Luckily, there is one former soldier. Unfortunately, he doesn’t have a gun with him. Fortunately, there is some other guy, who has a gun, but is not interested in the situation.
So, this soldier goes to the guy with a gun and asks silently: “Excuse me. We have this situation here, with only one terrorist, who is not paying good attention to what happens around him. Luckily, I was trained exactly for this kind of situation, and could reliably kill him with one shot. Could I borrow your gun, please? Of course, unless you want to do this yourself.”
And the guy says: “Uhm, I don’t care. I have no big problem with giving you my gun, but right at this moment I am watching a very interesting kitten video on youtube. It only takes ten minutes. So please don’t disturb me, I really enjoy watching this video. We can discuss the gun later.”
So the soldier, respecting this guy’s agency, waits respectfully. Ten minutes later (after your family was executed, and the terrorist now has some new hostages), the video ends, the guy asks: “Sorry, what did you need that gun for?” “To kill a terrorist.” “Yeah, no problem, take it.” The soldier kills the terrorist and everyone goes home. I mean, except for the terrorist and your family; they are dead.
How happy you are about the fact that the soldier respected that guy’s decision to finish watching the kitten video undisturbed? Imagine that there was an option that the soldier could inconspicuously turn off the wi-fi, so the guy would have paid him attention sooner; would that be an ethically preferable option?
The terrorist would be an agent diminishing the value of your scenario, so let’s say a bear is mauling a friend of mine while the guy watching cats on the internet is sitting on his bear repellant. I could push the guy away and save my friend, which of course I would do. However, I’m still committing an infraction against the guy who’s bear repellant I stole, I cannot argue that it would have been his moral duty to hand it over to me, and the guy has the right to ask for compensation in return. So I’m still a defector and society would do well to defect against me in proportion, which in this scenario I am of course perfectly willing to accept.
Now let’s say that two people are being mauled by the bear and the guy’s brain is somehow a bear repellant. Should I kill the guy? The retribution I deserve for that would be proportionally worse than in the first case. I might choose to, but I’d be a murderer and deserve to die in return.
So I’m still a defector and society would do well to defect against me in proportion
Which, of course, they wouldn’t do. They wouldn’t have much sympathy for the guy sitting one bear repellant, who chose not to help. In fact, refusing to help can be illegal.
I suppose in your terms, you could say that the guy-sitting-on-the-repellant is a defector, therefore it’s okay to defect against him.
I suppose in your terms, you could say that the guy-sitting-on-the-repellant is a defector, therefore it’s okay to defect against him.
No. My point is that the guy is not a defector. He merely refuses to cooperate which is an entirely different thing. So I am the defector whether or not society chooses to defect in return. And I really mean that society would do well to defect against me proportionally in return in order to discourage defection. Or to put it differently if I want to help and the guy does not, why should he have to bear (no pun intended) the cost and not me?
Societies often punish people that refuse to help. Why not consider people that break the law as defectors?
In fact, that would be an alternative (and my preferred) way to fix you second and third objection to value ethics. Consider everyone who breaks the laws and norms within your community as a defector. Where I live, torture is illegal and most people think it’s wrong to push the fat man, so pushing the fat man is (something like) breaking a norm.
Have you read Whose Utilitarianism?? Not sure if it addresses any of your concerns, but it’s good and about utilitarianism.
Okay, makes sense. There could be a technical problem with evaluating a punishment “in proportion”, because some things could be difficult to evaluate, but that is also a (much greater) problem in consequentialist ethics.
Perhaps precommitting works here. It’s a bad idea to make a rule “you must respect people’s agency except when you really need to violate it”. Adopting that rule would be beneficial in specific situations (like the one above) but generally would end in disaster.
If you instead make a rule “you must respect people’s agency unconditionally”, that rule is more practical. But you can’t make that rule and then change your mind when you’re in one of the rare situations where the other way happens to be better—if you did that, so would everyone else and you’d be screwed, on the average. So instead you precommit to following the rule and always respect people’s agency, even when not doing so is beneficial.
It’s a counterfactual mugging where instead of having to be the kind of person who would give Omega $100, you precommit to be the kind of person who would let his family die in this scenario because it benefits him in counterfactual scenarios. Thus, letting your family die here is ethical (although it may not be something people could realistically be expected to follow.)
(I don’t believe this, by the way, because while you can’t make a rule “respect people’s agency unless you really need to violate it” you can have a rule that says “respect people’s agency unless your excuse is good enough to convince a jury”.)
Sorry. I have reacted only to a part of your previous comment, but not to your original argument. So, uhm, here is a bit silly scenario that examines agency:
There is a terrorist somewhere, holding your family as hostages. He announced that he is going to execute them in five minutes.
There are no policemen nearby, and they can’t get there in five minutes. Luckily, there is one former soldier. Unfortunately, he doesn’t have a gun with him. Fortunately, there is some other guy, who has a gun, but is not interested in the situation.
So, this soldier goes to the guy with a gun and asks silently: “Excuse me. We have this situation here, with only one terrorist, who is not paying good attention to what happens around him. Luckily, I was trained exactly for this kind of situation, and could reliably kill him with one shot. Could I borrow your gun, please? Of course, unless you want to do this yourself.”
And the guy says: “Uhm, I don’t care. I have no big problem with giving you my gun, but right at this moment I am watching a very interesting kitten video on youtube. It only takes ten minutes. So please don’t disturb me, I really enjoy watching this video. We can discuss the gun later.”
So the soldier, respecting this guy’s agency, waits respectfully. Ten minutes later (after your family was executed, and the terrorist now has some new hostages), the video ends, the guy asks: “Sorry, what did you need that gun for?” “To kill a terrorist.” “Yeah, no problem, take it.” The soldier kills the terrorist and everyone goes home. I mean, except for the terrorist and your family; they are dead.
How happy you are about the fact that the soldier respected that guy’s decision to finish watching the kitten video undisturbed? Imagine that there was an option that the soldier could inconspicuously turn off the wi-fi, so the guy would have paid him attention sooner; would that be an ethically preferable option?
The terrorist would be an agent diminishing the value of your scenario, so let’s say a bear is mauling a friend of mine while the guy watching cats on the internet is sitting on his bear repellant. I could push the guy away and save my friend, which of course I would do. However, I’m still committing an infraction against the guy who’s bear repellant I stole, I cannot argue that it would have been his moral duty to hand it over to me, and the guy has the right to ask for compensation in return. So I’m still a defector and society would do well to defect against me in proportion, which in this scenario I am of course perfectly willing to accept.
Now let’s say that two people are being mauled by the bear and the guy’s brain is somehow a bear repellant. Should I kill the guy? The retribution I deserve for that would be proportionally worse than in the first case. I might choose to, but I’d be a murderer and deserve to die in return.
Which, of course, they wouldn’t do. They wouldn’t have much sympathy for the guy sitting one bear repellant, who chose not to help. In fact, refusing to help can be illegal.
I suppose in your terms, you could say that the guy-sitting-on-the-repellant is a defector, therefore it’s okay to defect against him.
No. My point is that the guy is not a defector. He merely refuses to cooperate which is an entirely different thing. So I am the defector whether or not society chooses to defect in return. And I really mean that society would do well to defect against me proportionally in return in order to discourage defection. Or to put it differently if I want to help and the guy does not, why should he have to bear (no pun intended) the cost and not me?
Societies often punish people that refuse to help. Why not consider people that break the law as defectors?
In fact, that would be an alternative (and my preferred) way to fix you second and third objection to value ethics. Consider everyone who breaks the laws and norms within your community as a defector. Where I live, torture is illegal and most people think it’s wrong to push the fat man, so pushing the fat man is (something like) breaking a norm.
Have you read Whose Utilitarianism?? Not sure if it addresses any of your concerns, but it’s good and about utilitarianism.
Okay, makes sense. There could be a technical problem with evaluating a punishment “in proportion”, because some things could be difficult to evaluate, but that is also a (much greater) problem in consequentialist ethics.
Perhaps precommitting works here. It’s a bad idea to make a rule “you must respect people’s agency except when you really need to violate it”. Adopting that rule would be beneficial in specific situations (like the one above) but generally would end in disaster.
If you instead make a rule “you must respect people’s agency unconditionally”, that rule is more practical. But you can’t make that rule and then change your mind when you’re in one of the rare situations where the other way happens to be better—if you did that, so would everyone else and you’d be screwed, on the average. So instead you precommit to following the rule and always respect people’s agency, even when not doing so is beneficial.
It’s a counterfactual mugging where instead of having to be the kind of person who would give Omega $100, you precommit to be the kind of person who would let his family die in this scenario because it benefits him in counterfactual scenarios. Thus, letting your family die here is ethical (although it may not be something people could realistically be expected to follow.)
(I don’t believe this, by the way, because while you can’t make a rule “respect people’s agency unless you really need to violate it” you can have a rule that says “respect people’s agency unless your excuse is good enough to convince a jury”.)