The term “nationalism” is used in at least two very different ways. The particularist use is more accurately termed “national chauvinism”, usually but not always ethnically-based, is the idea that one’s own nation is in some way better than all the others, and the interests of its people should be accorded disproportionate weight. Note that this kind of nationalist doesn’t necessarily care about political organization outside of his own country; he has an ideology about his nation, not necessarily about nations in general.
I would agree that used in this sense, “nationalism” is basically indefensible.
There is a different, generalist use of the term “nationalism,” however, which traces academically to people like Ernest Gellner, and philosophically, arguably back to people like Friedrich List. Nationalism in this sense, is merely the proposition, “National boundaries should coincide with state boundaries.” Importantly, it doesn’t require ethnically-defined nations, merely people who self-identify as being part of a common national community, whether that be based on blood, culture, or something else. A natural corollary of this view of nations and nationalism is that, at least in the world as it actually exists now, everyone is either a nationalist or an imperialist (one could carve out a small exception for anarchists).
In this generalist sense of “nationalism,” which makes claims not about “my nation” but about “all nations,” I think there are tradeoffs on both sides. I identify as an somewhat ambivalent nationalist. But unlike the the first sense, I don’t think you can argue that the nationalist position is prima facie inferior from a consequentialist standpoint.
The particularist use is more accurately termed “national chauvinism”, usually but not always ethnically-based, is the idea that one’s own nation is in some way better than all the others, and the interests of its people should be accorded disproportionate weight.
The “in some way better than all others” bit isn’t a very charitable reading of that position; if a Frenchman wants the french government to further the interests of France and Frenchmen (even at the expense of other countries), then it’s a form of nationalism but doesn’t include a belief that “France is better than the rest”; it’s only that he cares more about France than about the rest.
Having diminishing “circles of empathy” for others depending on whether they’re in your family, your city, your country, your religion or race etc. is pretty normal, but there’s variance about what levels are considered as more important; (pretty much) everybody cares more about their family, but some may see religion or political affiliation or their city as a “more important” identity than one’s country (this is assuming country = nation, which as you say is usually the case in the West now); “national chauvinists” would be the ones who put their country above other identities.
The term “nationalism” is used in at least two very different ways. The particularist use is more accurately termed “national chauvinism”, usually but not always ethnically-based, is the idea that one’s own nation is in some way better than all the others, and the interests of its people should be accorded disproportionate weight. Note that this kind of nationalist doesn’t necessarily care about political organization outside of his own country; he has an ideology about his nation, not necessarily about nations in general.
I would agree that used in this sense, “nationalism” is basically indefensible.
There is a different, generalist use of the term “nationalism,” however, which traces academically to people like Ernest Gellner, and philosophically, arguably back to people like Friedrich List. Nationalism in this sense, is merely the proposition, “National boundaries should coincide with state boundaries.” Importantly, it doesn’t require ethnically-defined nations, merely people who self-identify as being part of a common national community, whether that be based on blood, culture, or something else. A natural corollary of this view of nations and nationalism is that, at least in the world as it actually exists now, everyone is either a nationalist or an imperialist (one could carve out a small exception for anarchists).
In this generalist sense of “nationalism,” which makes claims not about “my nation” but about “all nations,” I think there are tradeoffs on both sides. I identify as an somewhat ambivalent nationalist. But unlike the the first sense, I don’t think you can argue that the nationalist position is prima facie inferior from a consequentialist standpoint.
The “in some way better than all others” bit isn’t a very charitable reading of that position; if a Frenchman wants the french government to further the interests of France and Frenchmen (even at the expense of other countries), then it’s a form of nationalism but doesn’t include a belief that “France is better than the rest”; it’s only that he cares more about France than about the rest.
Having diminishing “circles of empathy” for others depending on whether they’re in your family, your city, your country, your religion or race etc. is pretty normal, but there’s variance about what levels are considered as more important; (pretty much) everybody cares more about their family, but some may see religion or political affiliation or their city as a “more important” identity than one’s country (this is assuming country = nation, which as you say is usually the case in the West now); “national chauvinists” would be the ones who put their country above other identities.
This BTW is my beef with Mencius Moldbug when he points out that German nationalism is considered bad and Czech nationalism is considered good.