I feel like I’m tangled up in a lot of words and would like to point out that I’m not an expert and don’t have a tulpa, I just got the basics from reading lots of anecdotes on reddit.
You are entirely right here- although I’d like to point out most tulpas wouldn’t be able to do E2 and E3, independent or not. Also, that something like “composing a sonnet” is probably more the kind of thing brains do when their resources are dedicated to it by identities, not something identities do, and tulpas are mainly just identities. But I could be wrong both about that and what kind of activity sonet composing is.
“composing a sonnet” is probably more the kind of thing brains do when their resources are dedicated to it by identities, not something identities do, and tulpas are mainly just identities
Interesting! OK, that’s not a distinction I’d previously understood you as making. So, what do identities do, as distinct from what brains can be directed to do? (In my own model, FWIW, brains construct identities in much the same way brains compose sonnets.)
I guess I basically think of identities as user accounts, in this case. I just grabbed the closest fitting language dichotomy to “brain” (which IS referring to the physical brain) and trying to define and it further now will just lead to overfitting, especially since it almost certainly varies far more than either of us expect (due to the typical mind fallacy) from brain to brain.
And yea, brains construct identities the same way they construct sonnets. And just like music it can be small (jingle, minor character in something you write) or big (long symphony, Tulpa). And identities only slightly more compose sonnets, than sonnets create identities.
It’s all just mental content, that can be composed, remixed, deleted, executed, etc. Now, brains have a strong tendency to in the lack of an identity create one and give it root access, and this identity end up WAY more developed and powerful than even the most ancient and powerful tulpas, but there is no probably no or very little qualitative difference.
There are a lot of confounding factors. For example, something that I consider impossibly absurd seems to be the norm for most humans; considering their physical body as a part of “themselves” and feel as if they are violated if their body is. Put in their perspective, it’s not surprising most people can’t disentangle parts of their own brain(s), mind(s), and identities without meditating for years until they get it shaved in their face via direct perception, and even then probably often get it wrong. Although I guess my illness has shaved it in my face just as anviliciouslly.
Disclaimer: I got tired trying to put disclaimers on the dubious sources on each individual sentence, so just take it with a grain of salt OK and don’t assume I believe everything I say in any persistent way.
OK… I think I understand this. And I agree with much of it.
Some exceptions...
Now, brains have a strong tendency to in the lack of an identity create one and give it root access,
I don’t think I understand what you mean by “root access” here. Can you give me some examples of things that an identity with root access can do, that an identity without root access cannot do?
something that I consider impossibly absurd seems to be the norm for most humans; considering their physical body as a part of “themselves”
This is admittedly a digression, but for my own part, treating my physical body as part of myself seems no more absurd or arbitrary to me than treating my memories of what I had for breakfast this morning as part of myself, or my memories of my mom, or my inability to juggle. It’s kind of absurd, yes, but all attachment to personal identity is kind of absurd. We do it anyway.
All of that said… well, let me put it this way: continuing the sonnet analogy, let’s say my brain writes a sonnet (S1) today and then writes a sonnet (S2) tomorrow. To my way of thinking, the value-add of S2 over and above S1 depends significantly on the overlap between them. If the only difference is that S2 corrects a mis-spelled word in S1, for example, I’m inclined to say that value(S1+S2) = value(S2) ~= value(S1) .
For example, if S1 → S2 is an improvement, I’m happy to discard S1 if I can keep S2, but I’m almost as happy to discard S2 if I can keep S1 -- while I do have a preference for keeping S2 over keeping S1, it’s noise relative to my preference for keeping one of them over losing both.
I can imagine exceptions to the above, but they’re contrived.
So, the fix-a-mispelling case is one extreme, where the difference between S1 and S2 is very small. But as the difference increases, the value(S1+S2) = value(S2) ~= value(S1) equation becomes less and less acceptable. At the other extreme, I’m inclined to say that S2 is simply a separate sonnet, which was inspired by S1 but is distinct from it, and value(S1+S2) ~= value(S2) + value(S1).
And those extremes are really just two regions in a multidimensional space of sonnet-valuation.
Does that seem like a reasonable way to think about sonnets? (I don’t mean is it complete; of course there’s an enormous amount of necessary thinking about sonnets I’m not including here. I just mean have I said anything that strikes you as wrong?)
Does it seem like an equally reasonable way to think about identities?
Root access was probably a to metaphorical choice of words. Is “skeletal musculature privileges” clearer?
All those things like memories or skillsets you list as part of identity does seem weird, but even irrelevant software not nearly as weird as specific hardware. I mean seriously attaching significance to specific atoms? Wut? But of course, I know it’s really me thats weird and most humans do it.
I agree about what you say about sonnets, it’s very well put in fact. And yes identities do follow the same rules. Trying to come up with fitting tulpa stuff in the metaphor. Doesn’t really work though because I don’t know enough about it.
This is getting a wee bit complicated and I think we’re starting to reach the point where we have to dissolve the classifications and actually model things in detail on continuums, which means more conjecture and guesswork and less data and what data we have being less relevant. We’ve been working mostly in metaphors that doesn’t really go this far without breaking down. Also, since we’re getting into more and more detail, it also means th stuff we are examining is likely to be drowned out in the differences between brains, and the conversation turn into nonsense due to the typical mind fallacy.
As such, I am unwilling to widely sprout what’s likely to end up half nonsense at least publicly. Contact me by PM if you’re really all that interested in getting my working model of identities and mental bestiary.
I feel like I’m tangled up in a lot of words and would like to point out that I’m not an expert and don’t have a tulpa, I just got the basics from reading lots of anecdotes on reddit.
You are entirely right here- although I’d like to point out most tulpas wouldn’t be able to do E2 and E3, independent or not. Also, that something like “composing a sonnet” is probably more the kind of thing brains do when their resources are dedicated to it by identities, not something identities do, and tulpas are mainly just identities. But I could be wrong both about that and what kind of activity sonet composing is.
Interesting! OK, that’s not a distinction I’d previously understood you as making.
So, what do identities do, as distinct from what brains can be directed to do?
(In my own model, FWIW, brains construct identities in much the same way brains compose sonnets.)
I guess I basically think of identities as user accounts, in this case. I just grabbed the closest fitting language dichotomy to “brain” (which IS referring to the physical brain) and trying to define and it further now will just lead to overfitting, especially since it almost certainly varies far more than either of us expect (due to the typical mind fallacy) from brain to brain.
And yea, brains construct identities the same way they construct sonnets. And just like music it can be small (jingle, minor character in something you write) or big (long symphony, Tulpa). And identities only slightly more compose sonnets, than sonnets create identities.
It’s all just mental content, that can be composed, remixed, deleted, executed, etc. Now, brains have a strong tendency to in the lack of an identity create one and give it root access, and this identity end up WAY more developed and powerful than even the most ancient and powerful tulpas, but there is no probably no or very little qualitative difference.
There are a lot of confounding factors. For example, something that I consider impossibly absurd seems to be the norm for most humans; considering their physical body as a part of “themselves” and feel as if they are violated if their body is. Put in their perspective, it’s not surprising most people can’t disentangle parts of their own brain(s), mind(s), and identities without meditating for years until they get it shaved in their face via direct perception, and even then probably often get it wrong. Although I guess my illness has shaved it in my face just as anviliciouslly.
Disclaimer: I got tired trying to put disclaimers on the dubious sources on each individual sentence, so just take it with a grain of salt OK and don’t assume I believe everything I say in any persistent way.
OK… I think I understand this. And I agree with much of it.
Some exceptions...
I don’t think I understand what you mean by “root access” here. Can you give me some examples of things that an identity with root access can do, that an identity without root access cannot do?
This is admittedly a digression, but for my own part, treating my physical body as part of myself seems no more absurd or arbitrary to me than treating my memories of what I had for breakfast this morning as part of myself, or my memories of my mom, or my inability to juggle. It’s kind of absurd, yes, but all attachment to personal identity is kind of absurd. We do it anyway.
All of that said… well, let me put it this way: continuing the sonnet analogy, let’s say my brain writes a sonnet (S1) today and then writes a sonnet (S2) tomorrow. To my way of thinking, the value-add of S2 over and above S1 depends significantly on the overlap between them. If the only difference is that S2 corrects a mis-spelled word in S1, for example, I’m inclined to say that value(S1+S2) = value(S2) ~= value(S1) .
For example, if S1 → S2 is an improvement, I’m happy to discard S1 if I can keep S2, but I’m almost as happy to discard S2 if I can keep S1 -- while I do have a preference for keeping S2 over keeping S1, it’s noise relative to my preference for keeping one of them over losing both.
I can imagine exceptions to the above, but they’re contrived.
So, the fix-a-mispelling case is one extreme, where the difference between S1 and S2 is very small. But as the difference increases, the value(S1+S2) = value(S2) ~= value(S1) equation becomes less and less acceptable. At the other extreme, I’m inclined to say that S2 is simply a separate sonnet, which was inspired by S1 but is distinct from it, and value(S1+S2) ~= value(S2) + value(S1).
And those extremes are really just two regions in a multidimensional space of sonnet-valuation.
Does that seem like a reasonable way to think about sonnets? (I don’t mean is it complete; of course there’s an enormous amount of necessary thinking about sonnets I’m not including here. I just mean have I said anything that strikes you as wrong?)
Does it seem like an equally reasonable way to think about identities?
Root access was probably a to metaphorical choice of words. Is “skeletal musculature privileges” clearer?
All those things like memories or skillsets you list as part of identity does seem weird, but even irrelevant software not nearly as weird as specific hardware. I mean seriously attaching significance to specific atoms? Wut? But of course, I know it’s really me thats weird and most humans do it.
I agree about what you say about sonnets, it’s very well put in fact. And yes identities do follow the same rules. Trying to come up with fitting tulpa stuff in the metaphor. Doesn’t really work though because I don’t know enough about it.
This is getting a wee bit complicated and I think we’re starting to reach the point where we have to dissolve the classifications and actually model things in detail on continuums, which means more conjecture and guesswork and less data and what data we have being less relevant. We’ve been working mostly in metaphors that doesn’t really go this far without breaking down. Also, since we’re getting into more and more detail, it also means th stuff we are examining is likely to be drowned out in the differences between brains, and the conversation turn into nonsense due to the typical mind fallacy.
As such, I am unwilling to widely sprout what’s likely to end up half nonsense at least publicly. Contact me by PM if you’re really all that interested in getting my working model of identities and mental bestiary.