Lots of separate issues getting tangled up here. Let me try to clarify what I mean:
1) I meant a win in the sense that the aggregate, people’s shoplifting decisions lead them to have opportunities that they would not have if they calculated the optimality of shoplifting as causal decision theorists. There is certainly a (corresponding, dual) sense in which people don’t win—specifically, the case where their recognition of certain rights is so lacking that they don’t actually every get the opportunity to shoplift—or even buy—certain goods in the first place. These are the stores and business models that don’t exist in the first place and leave us in a Pareto-inferior position. (IP recognition, I’m looking in your general direction here.)
2) When I asked for a causal account above, what I meant was, “How do you explain, assuming everyone uses CDT, why most people don’t shoplift, given the constraints I listed?” That is, what CDT-type reasoning tells you not to shoplift when it’s trivial to get away with?
3) I claim that it is possible—in fact, necessary—to give an evolutionary account of why people don’t act purely as causal decision theorists (and it’s not particularly important what you call the non-causal motivations behind their decisions), since people demonstrably differ from CDT. (My Parfitian filter article was an attempt, citing Drescher, to account for these non-causal, “moral” components of human reasoning through natural selection.)
4) However, I don’t think the the issue of ESSes and shoplifting are necessarily connected in the sense that you have to explain the (absence of) the latter as the former. However, I believe the opportunity to shoplift is a real-world example of Newcomb’s problem, in which people (do the analogue of) one-box, even though it’s certainly not because of TDT-type reasoning. This raises the question of why people use a decision theory that gives the same results as TDT would on a “contrived” problem.
How do you explain, assuming everyone uses CDT, why most people don’t shoplift, given the constraints I listed?
But that is an absurd request for explanation, because you are demanding that two false statements be accepted as hypotheses:
That shoplifting is risk-free.
That everyone adheres to a particular normative decision theory.
As to the definition of “winning”, I sense that there is still a failure to communicate here. Are you talking about winning individuals or winning societies? As I see it, given your unrealistic hypotheses, the winning strategy is to shoplift, but convince other people that they win by not shoplifting. The losing strategy seems to be the one you advocate—which is apparently to refrain from shoplifting, while encouraging others to shoplift by denying the efficacy of punishment.
But that is an absurd request for explanation, because you are demanding that two false statements be accepted as hypotheses:
That shoplifting is risk-free.
That everyone adheres to a particular normative decision theory.
No, I’m showing that they can’t both be true. (Btw, what does “normative” add to your meaning here.) (1) is false, but easily close enough to truth for our purposes.
As I see it, given your unrealistic hypotheses, the winning strategy is to shoplift, but convince other people that they win by not shoplifting.
Hence the parallel to Newcomb’s problem, where the “winning” strategy is to two-box, but convince Omega you’ll one-box, and hence the tension between whether the “individual” or “society” perspective is correct here.
If you would deem it optimal to shoplift, worse stores are available in the first place, just as if you would deem it optimal to two-box, emptier boxes are available in the first place.
Something motivates people not to shoplift given present conditions, which is isomorphic to one-boxing “given” that Omega has left. So, I claim, it’s a real life case of people consistently one-boxing. A world (or at least, community) in which people deem it more optimal to shoplift has different (and worse) opportunities than one in which people do not. Their decisions “in the moment” are not unrelated to what kind of community they are in the first place.
(1) is false, but easily close enough to truth for our purposes.
I suspect that this claim is at the heart of the dispute. I think that it is far from close enough to the truth.
The reason people don’t shoplift is that they fear the consequences. There is no mystery to be explained. Except perhaps why people are sufficiently motivated by fear of being temporarily physically constrained by a store-owner or security guard and publicly shamed (typical punishment for a first offense).
Btw, what does “normative” add to your meaning here.
It serves to emphasize the type-error that I see in your request. You seem to be criticizing one normative theory (CDT) while promoting another (UDT/TDT). But you are doing so by asking whether the normative theory is satisfactory when used as a descriptive theory. And you are asking that it function descriptively in a fictitious universe in which shoplifters are rarely caught and mildly punished.
I agreed there is no need to invoke TDT/UDT to explain lack of shoplifting.
In addition to what Perplexed said, it seems to me that people tend to care more about their reputation compared to what is evolutionarily adaptive today, probably because in our EEA, you couldn’t move to a new city and start over (or if you could move to another tribe, it was only at an extremely high cost), nor did you interact mostly with strangers. That would explain why people are sometimes deterred or motivated by reputation/shame when it doesn’t seem to make sense to be, without having to invoke TDT/UDT.
[“Shoplifting is risk-free”] is false, but easily close enough to truth for our purposes.
I don’t think so. Shoplifting is more and less risky in different places and situations. I bet that the amount of shoplifting is monotone increasing in the amount of risk, even when that amount is relatively small. If that’s true, then “why don’t people shoplift more” doesn’t require an explanation beyond “because they don’t want to take the risk.” Do you disagree?
Yes, I disagree. Keep in mind, there is a very wide variety of protection a store can have for its goods. The depends on the value of the goods, but also on the “kind of person” that exists in the area, and the latter factor is crucial to understanding the dynamic I’m trying to highlight.
For the same goods, a store will have more security measures in areas where the “kind of people” (decision theory types) tend to steal more. But the population is never uniform. So, although the security measures account for some percentage of prevented shoplifting (and thus can be explained purely though causal consequences to shoplifters), there remains the group that differs from the typical person in the area. This group must stay sufficiently small for the store to stay profitable.
Therefore, the store is relying on a certain fraction of the population refraining from shoplifting even when they could get away with it.
But even if shoplifting is really kept low because of (mistaken) beliefs about its difficulty, that still doesn’t eliminate the newcomblike aspect. You still have to account for why this epistemic error happens in just the right way so as to increase total utility. And the explanation for that looks similar to the evolution case I discussed at the beginning of this subthread, but with memes replacing genes: basically, regions with “better norms” or “more systematic overestimation of shoplifting’s difficulty” will tend to flourish and outcompete those that don’t. Economic competition, then, acts as a sort of “Parfitian filter” in the same sense that evolution does.
Lots of separate issues getting tangled up here. Let me try to clarify what I mean:
1) I meant a win in the sense that the aggregate, people’s shoplifting decisions lead them to have opportunities that they would not have if they calculated the optimality of shoplifting as causal decision theorists. There is certainly a (corresponding, dual) sense in which people don’t win—specifically, the case where their recognition of certain rights is so lacking that they don’t actually every get the opportunity to shoplift—or even buy—certain goods in the first place. These are the stores and business models that don’t exist in the first place and leave us in a Pareto-inferior position. (IP recognition, I’m looking in your general direction here.)
2) When I asked for a causal account above, what I meant was, “How do you explain, assuming everyone uses CDT, why most people don’t shoplift, given the constraints I listed?” That is, what CDT-type reasoning tells you not to shoplift when it’s trivial to get away with?
3) I claim that it is possible—in fact, necessary—to give an evolutionary account of why people don’t act purely as causal decision theorists (and it’s not particularly important what you call the non-causal motivations behind their decisions), since people demonstrably differ from CDT. (My Parfitian filter article was an attempt, citing Drescher, to account for these non-causal, “moral” components of human reasoning through natural selection.)
4) However, I don’t think the the issue of ESSes and shoplifting are necessarily connected in the sense that you have to explain the (absence of) the latter as the former. However, I believe the opportunity to shoplift is a real-world example of Newcomb’s problem, in which people (do the analogue of) one-box, even though it’s certainly not because of TDT-type reasoning. This raises the question of why people use a decision theory that gives the same results as TDT would on a “contrived” problem.
But that is an absurd request for explanation, because you are demanding that two false statements be accepted as hypotheses:
That shoplifting is risk-free.
That everyone adheres to a particular normative decision theory.
As to the definition of “winning”, I sense that there is still a failure to communicate here. Are you talking about winning individuals or winning societies? As I see it, given your unrealistic hypotheses, the winning strategy is to shoplift, but convince other people that they win by not shoplifting. The losing strategy seems to be the one you advocate—which is apparently to refrain from shoplifting, while encouraging others to shoplift by denying the efficacy of punishment.
No, I’m showing that they can’t both be true. (Btw, what does “normative” add to your meaning here.) (1) is false, but easily close enough to truth for our purposes.
Hence the parallel to Newcomb’s problem, where the “winning” strategy is to two-box, but convince Omega you’ll one-box, and hence the tension between whether the “individual” or “society” perspective is correct here.
If you would deem it optimal to shoplift, worse stores are available in the first place, just as if you would deem it optimal to two-box, emptier boxes are available in the first place.
Something motivates people not to shoplift given present conditions, which is isomorphic to one-boxing “given” that Omega has left. So, I claim, it’s a real life case of people consistently one-boxing. A world (or at least, community) in which people deem it more optimal to shoplift has different (and worse) opportunities than one in which people do not. Their decisions “in the moment” are not unrelated to what kind of community they are in the first place.
I suspect that this claim is at the heart of the dispute. I think that it is far from close enough to the truth.
The reason people don’t shoplift is that they fear the consequences. There is no mystery to be explained. Except perhaps why people are sufficiently motivated by fear of being temporarily physically constrained by a store-owner or security guard and publicly shamed (typical punishment for a first offense).
It serves to emphasize the type-error that I see in your request. You seem to be criticizing one normative theory (CDT) while promoting another (UDT/TDT). But you are doing so by asking whether the normative theory is satisfactory when used as a descriptive theory. And you are asking that it function descriptively in a fictitious universe in which shoplifters are rarely caught and mildly punished.
I agreed there is no need to invoke TDT/UDT to explain lack of shoplifting.
In addition to what Perplexed said, it seems to me that people tend to care more about their reputation compared to what is evolutionarily adaptive today, probably because in our EEA, you couldn’t move to a new city and start over (or if you could move to another tribe, it was only at an extremely high cost), nor did you interact mostly with strangers. That would explain why people are sometimes deterred or motivated by reputation/shame when it doesn’t seem to make sense to be, without having to invoke TDT/UDT.
I don’t think so. Shoplifting is more and less risky in different places and situations. I bet that the amount of shoplifting is monotone increasing in the amount of risk, even when that amount is relatively small. If that’s true, then “why don’t people shoplift more” doesn’t require an explanation beyond “because they don’t want to take the risk.” Do you disagree?
Yes, I disagree. Keep in mind, there is a very wide variety of protection a store can have for its goods. The depends on the value of the goods, but also on the “kind of person” that exists in the area, and the latter factor is crucial to understanding the dynamic I’m trying to highlight.
For the same goods, a store will have more security measures in areas where the “kind of people” (decision theory types) tend to steal more. But the population is never uniform. So, although the security measures account for some percentage of prevented shoplifting (and thus can be explained purely though causal consequences to shoplifters), there remains the group that differs from the typical person in the area. This group must stay sufficiently small for the store to stay profitable.
Therefore, the store is relying on a certain fraction of the population refraining from shoplifting even when they could get away with it.
But even if shoplifting is really kept low because of (mistaken) beliefs about its difficulty, that still doesn’t eliminate the newcomblike aspect. You still have to account for why this epistemic error happens in just the right way so as to increase total utility. And the explanation for that looks similar to the evolution case I discussed at the beginning of this subthread, but with memes replacing genes: basically, regions with “better norms” or “more systematic overestimation of shoplifting’s difficulty” will tend to flourish and outcompete those that don’t. Economic competition, then, acts as a sort of “Parfitian filter” in the same sense that evolution does.