A prediction that’s impossible to test is a contradiction in terms. Show me any unfalsifiable theory, and I’ll invent some predictions that follow from it, they will just be “impossible to test”.
Ok, so don’t call the existence of Odin or what’s happening inside the box “predictions.” Then I’ll rephrase my question:
Why do we only care about “predictions” and not “everything a theory says about reality?” Clearly all three pairs of theories I mentioned above say different things about reality even if it is impossible in some sense to observe this difference.
(I’ll add to this later, but I’m pressed for time currently)
edit: nothing to add, actually
How can we distinguish statements that are “about reality” from statements that aren’t, if we just threw away the criteria of predictive power and verification?
How about counterfactual predictive power and verification? If I could observe the inside of that box, then I could see a difference between the two theories.
I realize this opens a potential can of worms, i.e., what sort of counterfactuals are we allowed to consider? But in any case, this is how I’ve understood the basic idea of falsifiability. Compare to Yvain’s logs ofthe universe idea. (He’s doing something different with it, I know)
I disagree, since prediction != theory. It is certainly possible to have a theory (e.g. Freud’s ideas about the ego and superego) that make no predictions. In the comment above, cousin_it is correct in that “unfalsifiable prediction” is a contradiction, but “unfalsifiable theory” is not. It just means that the theory is not well-formed and does not pay rent.
A prediction that’s impossible to test is a contradiction in terms. Show me any unfalsifiable theory, and I’ll invent some predictions that follow from it, they will just be “impossible to test”.
Ok, so don’t call the existence of Odin or what’s happening inside the box “predictions.” Then I’ll rephrase my question:
Why do we only care about “predictions” and not “everything a theory says about reality?” Clearly all three pairs of theories I mentioned above say different things about reality even if it is impossible in some sense to observe this difference.
(I’ll add to this later, but I’m pressed for time currently) edit: nothing to add, actually
How can we distinguish statements that are “about reality” from statements that aren’t, if we just threw away the criteria of predictive power and verification?
How about counterfactual predictive power and verification? If I could observe the inside of that box, then I could see a difference between the two theories.
I realize this opens a potential can of worms, i.e., what sort of counterfactuals are we allowed to consider? But in any case, this is how I’ve understood the basic idea of falsifiability. Compare to Yvain’s logs of the universe idea. (He’s doing something different with it, I know)
...and this is why Popperian falsificationism is wrong!
There aren’t any “unfalsifiable” theories, though there may be unintelligible theories.
I disagree, since prediction != theory. It is certainly possible to have a theory (e.g. Freud’s ideas about the ego and superego) that make no predictions. In the comment above, cousin_it is correct in that “unfalsifiable prediction” is a contradiction, but “unfalsifiable theory” is not. It just means that the theory is not well-formed and does not pay rent.
Though cousin_it will have to speak for himself, I believe he was specifically disagreeing with this when he wrote: